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Abstract
Crowdsourcing has gained immense popularity in machine learning applications for obtaining large
amounts of labeled data. Crowdsourcing is cheap and fast, but suffers from the problem of low-quality
data. To address this fundamental challenge in crowdsourcing, we propose a simple payment mechanism
to incentivize workers to answer only the questions that they are sure of and skip the rest. We show that
surprisingly, under a mild and natural “no-free-lunch” requirement, this mechanism is the one and only
incentive-compatible payment mechanism possible. We also show that among all possible incentive-
compatible mechanisms (that may or may not satisfy no-free-lunch), our mechanism makes the smallest
possible payment to spammers. We further extend our results to a more general setting in which workers
are required to provide a quantized confidence for each question. Interestingly, this unique mechanism
takes a “multiplicative” form. The simplicity of the mechanism is an added benefit. In preliminary
experiments involving over 900 worker-task pairs, we observe a significant drop in the error rates under
this unique mechanism for the same or lower monetary expenditure.
1 Introduction
Complex machine learning tools such as deep learning are gaining increasing popularity and are being ap-
plied to a wide variety of problems. These tools require large amounts of labeled data [HDY+12, RYZ+10,
DDS+09, CBW+10]. These large labeling tasks are being performed by coordinating crowds of semi-skilled
workers through the Internet. This is known as crowdsourcing. Generating large labeled data sets through
crowdsourcing is inexpensive and fast as compared to employing experts. Furthermore, given the current
platforms for crowdsourcing such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and many others, the initial overhead of
setting up a crowdsourcing task is minimal. Crowdsourcing as a means of collecting labeled training data
has now become indispensable to the engineering of intelligent systems. The crowdsourcing of labels is also
often used to supplement automated algorithms, to perform the tasks that are too difficult to accomplish by
machines alone [KDC+11, LRR11, BLM+10, VAMM+08, FKK+11].
Most workers in crowdsourcing are not experts. As a consequence, labels obtained from crowdsourcing
typically have a significant amount of error [KKKMF11, VdVE11, WLC+10]. It is not surprising that there
is significant emphasis on having higher quality labeled data for machine learning algorithms, since a higher
amount of noise implies requirement of more labels for obtaining the same accuracy in practice. Moreover,
several algorithms and settings are not very tolerant of data that is noisy [LS10, HY10, MS13, BP09]; for
instance, [LS10] conclude that “a range of different types of boosting algorithms that optimize a convex
potential function satisfying mild conditions cannot tolerate random classification noise.” Recent efforts
have focused on developing statistical techniques to post-process the noisy labels in order to improve its
quality (e.g., [RYZ+10, ZPBM12, WJ11, CBCTH13, DS79, KOS11, LPI12, ZCZJ14, IPSW14]). However,
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Is this the Golden Gate Bridge?
Yes
No
a b Is this the Golden Gate Bridge?
Yes
No
I’m not sure
c Is this the Golden Gate Bridge?
Yes      Moderately sure Absolutely sure
No  Moderately sure Absolutely sure
I’m not sure
Figure 1: Different interfaces for a task that requires the worker to answer the question “Is this the Golden
Gate Bridge?”: (a) the conventional interface; (b) with an option to skip; (c) with multiple confidence levels.
when the inputs to these algorithms are very erroneous, it is difficult to guarantee that the processed labels
will be reliable enough for subsequent use by machine learning or other applications. In order to avoid
“garbage in, garbage out”, we take a complementary approach to this problem: cleaning the data at the time
of collection.
We consider crowdsourcing settings where the workers are paid for their services, such as in the popu-
lar crowdsourcing platforms of Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com), Crowdflower (crowdflower.
com) and other commercial platforms, as well as internal crowdsourcing platforms of companies such as
Google, Facebook and Microsoft. These commercial platforms have gained substantial popularity due to
their support for a diverse range of tasks for machine learning labeling, varying from image annotation and
text recognition to speech captioning and machine translation. We consider problems that are objective in
nature, that is, have a definite answer. Figure 1a depicts an example of such a question where the worker is
shown a set of images, and for each image, the worker is required to identify if the image depicts the Golden
Gate Bridge.
Our approach builds on the simple insight that in typical crowdsourcing setups, workers are simply paid
in proportion to the amount of tasks they complete. As a result, workers attempt to answer questions that
they are not sure of, thereby increasing the error rate of the labels. For the questions that a worker is not sure
of, her answers could be very unreliable [WLC+10, KKKMF11, VdVE11, JSV14]. To ensure acquisition of
only high-quality labels, we wish to encourage the worker to skip the questions about which she is unsure,
for instance, by providing an explicit “I’m not sure” option for every question (see Figure 1b). Given this
additional option, one must also ensure that the worker is indeed incentivized to skip the questions that she
is not confident about. In a more general form, we consider eliciting the confidence of the worker for each
question at multiple levels. For instance, in addition to “I’m not sure”, we may also provide options like
“absolutely sure”, and “moderately sure” (see Figure 1c). The goal is to design payment mechanisms that
incentivize the worker to attempt only those questions for which they are confident enough, or alternatively,
report their confidences truthfully. As we will see later, this significantly improves the aggregate quality
of the labels that are input to the machine learning algorithms. We will term any payment mechanism that
incentivizes the worker to do so as “incentive compatible”.
In addition to incentive compatibility, preventing spammers is another desirable requirement from in-
centive mechanisms in crowdsourcing. Spammers are workers who answer randomly without regard to the
question being asked, in the hope of earning some free money, and are known to exist in large numbers on
crowdsourcing platforms [WLC+10, Boh11, KKKMF11, VdVE11]. The presence of spammers can signif-
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icantly affect the performance of any machine learning algorithm that is trained on this data. It is thus of
interest to deter spammers by paying them as low as possible. An intuitive objective, to this end, is to ensure
a minimum possible expenditure on spammers who answer randomly. For instance, in a task with binary-
choice questions, a spammer is expected to have half of the attempted answers incorrect; one may thus wish
to set the payment to its minimum possible value if half or more of the attempted answers are wrong. In this
paper, however, we impose strictly and significantly weaker requirement, and then show that there is one
and only one incentive-compatible mechanism that can satisfy this weak requirement. Our requirement is
referred to as the “no-free-lunch” axiom. In the skip-based setting, it says that if all the questions attempted
by the worker are answered incorrectly, then the payment must be the minimum possible. The no-free-lunch
axiom for the general confidence-based setting is even weaker: if the worker indicates the highest confi-
dence level for all the questions she attempts in the gold standard, and furthermore if all these responses
are incorrect, then the payment must be the minimum possible. We term this condition the “no-free-lunch”
axiom. In the general confidence-based setting, we want to make the minimum possible payment if the
worker indicates the highest confidence level for all the questions she attempts and if all these responses are
incorrect.
In order to test whether our mechanism is practically viable, and to assess the quality of the final labels
obtained, we conducted experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform. In our pre-
liminary experiments that involved several hundred workers, we found that the quality of data consistently
improved by use of our schemes as compared to the standard settings, often by two-fold or higher, with the
total monetary expenditure being the same or lower as compared to the conventional baseline.
Summary of Contributions. We propose a payment mechanism for the aforementioned setting (“incen-
tive compatibility” plus “no-free-lunch”), and show that surprisingly, this is the only possible mechanism.
We also show that additionally, our mechanism makes the smallest possible payment to spammers among
all possible incentive compatible mechanisms that may or may not satisfy the no-free-lunch axiom. Inter-
estingly, our payment mechanism takes a multiplicative form: the evaluation of the worker’s response to
each question is a certain score, and the final payment is a product of these scores. This mechanism has
additional appealing features in that it is simple to compute, and is also simple to explain to the workers.
Our mechanism is applicable to any type of objective questions, including multiple choice annotation ques-
tions, transcription tasks, etc. In preliminary experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk involving over 900
worker-task pairs, the quality of data improved significantly under our unique mechanism, with the total
monetary expenditure being the same or lower as compared to the conventional baseline.
Related Literature. The framework of “strictly proper scoring rules” [Bri50, Sav71, GR07, LS09] pro-
vides a general theory for eliciting information for settings where this information can subsequently be
verified by the mechanism designer, for example, by observing the true value some time in the future. In
our work, this verification is performed via the presence of some “gold standard” questions in the task.
Consequently, our mechanisms can also be called “strictly proper scoring rules”. It is important to note that
the framework of strictly proper scoring rules, however, provides a large collection of possible mechanisms
and does not guide the choice of a specific mechanism from this collection [GR07]. In this work, we show
that for the crowdsourcing setups considered, under a very mild “no-free-lunch” condition, the mechanism
proposed in this paper is the one and only strictly proper scoring rule.
Interestingly, proper scoring rules have another interesting connection with machine learning techniques:
to quote [BSS05], “proper scoring rules comprise most loss functions currently in use: log-loss, squared
error loss, boosting loss, and as limiting cases cost-weighted misclassification losses.” The present paper
does not investigate this aspect of proper scoring rules, and we refer the reader to [BH07, MWB07, BSS05]
for more details.
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The design of statistical inference algorithms for denoising the data obtained from workers is an active
topic of research [RYZ+10, ZPBM12, WJ11, CBCTH13, KHH12, DS79, KOS11, LPI12, ZCZJ14, VVV14,
IPSW14]. In addition, several machine learning algorithms accommodating errors in the data have also been
designed [AL88, CDGL01, LLYL04, CWZ04]. These algorithms are typically oblivious to the elicitation
procedure. Our work nicely complements this line of research in that these inference algorithms may now
additionally employ the higher quality data and the specific structure of the elicited data for an improved
denoising efficiency.
Another relevant problem in crowdourcing is that of choosing which workers to hire or efficiently match-
ing workers to tasks, and such problems are studied in [YKL11, HJV13, ZCL14, AGN14] under different
contexts. Our work assumes that a worker is already matched, and focuses on incentivizing that worker to
respond in a certain manner. A recent line of work has focussed on elicitation of data from multiple agents
in order to perform certain specific estimation tasks [FSW07, DFP08, CDP15]. In contrast, our goal is to
ensure that workers censor their own low-quality (raw) data, without restricting our attention to any specific
downstream algorithm or task.
Organization. The organization of this paper is as follows. We present the formal problem setting in
Section 2. In Section 3 we consider the skip-based setting: We present our proposed mechanism and show
that it is the only mechanism which satisfies the requirements discussed above. In Section 4, we then
consider the more general setting of eliciting a quantized value of the worker’s confidence. We construct a
mechanism for this setting, which also takes a multiplicative form, and prove its uniqueness. In Section 5
we prove that imposing a requirement that is only slightly stronger than our proposed no-free-lunch axiom
leads to impossibility results. In Section 6 we present synthetic simulations and real-world experiments on
Amazon Mechanical Turk to evaluate the potential of our setting and algorithm to work in practice. We
conclude the paper with a discussion on the various modeling choices, future work, and concluding remarks
in Section 7.
The paper contains three appendices. In Appendix A we prove all theoretical results whose proofs are
not presented in the main text. We provide more details of the experiments in Appendix B. In Appendix C
we extend our results to a setting where workers aim to maximize the expected value of some “utility” of
their payments.
2 Setting and Notation
In the crowdsourcing setting that we consider, one or more workers perform a task, where a task consists of
multiple questions. The questions are objective, by which we mean, each question has precisely one correct
answer. Examples of objective questions include multiple-choice classification questions such as Figure 1,
questions on transcribing text from audio or images, etc.
For any possible answer to any question, we define the worker’s confidence about an answer as the
probability, according to her belief, of this answer being correct. In other words, one can assume that the
worker has (in her mind) a probability distribution over all possible answers to a question, and the confidence
for an answer is the probability of that answer being correct. As a shorthand, we also define the confidence
about a question as the confidence for the answer that the worker is most confident about for that question.
We assume that the worker’s confidences for different questions are independent. Our goal is that for every
question, the worker should be incentivized to skip if her confidence for that question is below a certain pre-
defined threshold, otherwise select the answer that she is most confident about, and if asked, also indicate a
correct (quantized) value of her confidence for the answer.
Specifically, we consider two settings:
4
• Skip-based. For each question, the worker can either choose to ‘skip’ the question or provide an answer
(Figure 1b).
• Confidence-based. For each question, the worker can either ‘skip’ the question or provide an answer,
and in the latter case, indicate her confidence for this answer as a number in {1, . . . , L} (Figure 1c). We
term this indicated confidence as the ‘confidence-level’. Here, L represents the highest confidence-level,
and ‘skip’ is considered to be a confidence-level of 0. 1
One can see from the aforementioned definition that the confidence-based setting is a generalization of the
skip-based setting (the skip-based setting corresponds to L = 1). The goal is to ensure that for a given set
of intervals that partition [0, 1], for every question the worker is incentivized to indicate ‘skip’ or choose
the appropriate confidence-level when her confidence for that question falls in the corresponding interval.
The choice of these intervals will be defined subsequently in the skip-based and confidence-based sections
(Section 3 and Section 4) respectively.
LetN denote the total number of questions in the task. Among these questions, we assume the existence
of some “gold standard” questions, that is, a set of questions whose answers are known to the requester. Let
G (1 ≤ G ≤ N) denote the number of gold standard questions. The G gold standard questions are assumed
to be distributed uniformly at random in the pool of N questions (of course, the worker does not know
which G of the N questions form the gold standard). The payment to a worker for a task is computed after
receiving her responses to all the questions in the task. The payment is based on the worker’s performance
on the gold standard questions. Since the payment is based on known answers, the payments to different
workers do not depend on each other, thereby allowing us to consider the presence of only one worker
without any loss in generality.
We will employ the following standard notation. For any positive integer K, the set {1, . . . ,K} is
denoted by [K]. The indicator function is denoted by 1, i.e., 1{z} = 1 if z is true, and 0 otherwise.
Let x1, . . . , xG denote the evaluations of the answers that the worker gives to the G gold standard
questions, and let f denote the scoring rule, i.e., a function that determines the payment to the worker based
on these evaluations x1, . . . , xG.
In the skip-based setting, xi ∈ {−1, 0,+1} for all i ∈ [G]. Here, “0” denotes that the worker skipped the
question, “−1” denotes that the worker attempted to answer the question and that answer was incorrect, and
“+1” denotes that the worker attempted to answer the question and that answer was correct. The payment
function is f : {−1, 0,+1}G → R.
In the confidence-based setting, xi ∈ {−L, . . . ,+L} for all i ∈ [G]. Here, we set xi = 0 if the
worker skipped the question, and for l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, we set xi = l if the question was answered correctly
with confidence l and xi = −l if the question was answered incorrectly with confidence l. The function
f : {−L, . . . ,+L}G → R specifies the payment to be made to the worker.
The payment is further associated to two parameters, µmax and µmin. The parameter µmax denotes the
budget, i.e., the maximum amount that is paid to any individual worker for this task:
max
x1,...,xG
f(x1, . . . , xG) = µmax.
The amount µmax is thus the amount of compensation paid to a perfect worker for her work. Further, one
may often also have the requirement of paying a certain minimum amount to any worker. The parameter
µmin (≤ µmax) denotes this minimum payment: the payment function must also satisfy
min
x1,...,xG
f(x1, . . . , xG) ≥ µmin.
1When the task is presented to the workers, the word ‘skip’ or the numbers {1, . . . , L} are replaced by more comprehensible
phrases such as “I don’t know”, “moderately sure”, “absolutely sure”, etc.
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For instance, crowdsourcing platforms today allow payments to workers, but do not allow imposing penal-
ties: this condition gives µmin = 0.
We assume that the worker attempts to maximize her overall expected payment. In what follows, the
expression ‘the worker’s expected payment’ will refer to the expected payment from the worker’s point of
view, and the expectation will be taken with respect to the worker’s confidences about her answers and the
uniformly random choice of the G gold standard questions among the N questions in the task. For any
question i ∈ [N ], suppose the worker indicates the confidence-level yi ∈ {0, . . . , L}. Further, for every
question i ∈ [N ] such that yi 6= 0, let pi be the confidence of the worker for the answer she has selected
for question i, and for every question i ∈ [N ] such that yi = 0, let pi ∈ (0, 1) be any arbitrary value. Let
E = (1, . . . , G) ∈ {−1, 1}G. Then from the worker’s perspective, the expected payment for the selected
answers and confidence-levels is
1(
N
G
) ∑
(j1,...,jG)
⊆{1,...,N}
∑
E∈{−1,1}G
(
f(1yj1 , . . . , GyjG)
G∏
i=1
(pji)
1+i
2 (1− pji)
1−i
2
)
.
In the expression above, the outermost summation corresponds to the expectation with respect to the random-
ness arising from the unknown positions of the gold standard questions. The inner summation corresponds
to the expectation with respect to the worker’s beliefs about the correctness of her responses.
A payment function f is called a incentive compatible if the expected payment of the worker under this
payment function is strictly maximized when the worker answers in the manner desired. The specific re-
quirements of the skip-based and the confidence-based settings are discussed subsequently in their respective
sections. We begin with the skip-based setting.
3 Skip-based Setting
In this section, we consider the setting where for every question, the worker can choose to either answer the
question or to skip it; no additional information is asked from the worker. See Figure 1b for an illustration.
3.1 Setting
Let T ∈ (0, 1) be a predefined value. The goal is to design payment mechanisms that incentivize the worker
to skip the questions for which her confidence is lower than T , and answer those for which her confidence is
higher than T . 2 Moreover, for the questions that she attempts to answer, she must be incentivized to select
the answer that she believes is most likely to be correct. The value of T is chosen apriori based on factors
such as budget constraints or the targeted quality of labels. The value of T may also depend on the choice
of the algorithm that will subsequently be employed to aggregate the answers provided by multiple workers.
In this paper, we will assume that the value of the threshold T is already specified to us.
We impose the following simple and natural requirement:
Axiom 1 (No-free-lunch Axiom) If all the answers attempted by the worker in the gold standard are
wrong, then the payment is the minimum possible. More formally, f(x1, . . . , xG) = µmin for every evalua-
tion (x1, . . . , xG) such that 0 <
∑G
i=1 1{xi 6= 0} =
∑G
i=1 1{xi = −1}.
One may expect a payment mechanism to impose the restriction of minimum payment to spammers who
answer randomly. For instance, in a task with binary-choice questions, a spammer is expected to have 50%
of the attempted answers incorrect; one may thus wish to set a the minimum possible payment if 50% or
more of the attempted answers were incorrect. The no-free-lunch axiom which we impose is however a
significantly weaker condition, mandating minimum payment if all attempted answers are incorrect.
2In the event that the confidence about a question is exactly equal to T , the worker may choose to answer or skip.
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3.2 Payment Mechanism
We now present our proposed payment mechanism in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Incentive mechanism for skip-based setting
• Inputs:
I Threshold T
I Budget parameters µmax and µmin
I Evaluations (x1, . . . , xG) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}G of the worker’s answers to the G gold standard
questions
• Set α−1 = 0, α0 = 1, α+1 = 1T
• The payment is
f(x1, . . . , xG) = κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + µmin,
where κ = (µmax − µmin)TG.
The proposed mechanism has a multiplicative form: each answer in the gold standard is given a score
based on whether it was correct (score = 1T ), incorrect (score = 0) or skipped (score = 1), and the final
payment is simply a product of these scores (scaled and shifted by constants). The mechanism is easy to
describe to workers: For instance, if T = 12 , G = 3, µmax = 80 cents and µmin = 0 cents, then the
description reads:
“The reward starts at 10 cents. For every correct answer in the 3 gold standard questions, the
reward will double. However, if any of these questions are answered incorrectly, then the reward
will become zero. So please use the ‘I’m not sure’ option wisely.”
Observe how this payment rule is similar to the popular ‘double or nothing’ paradigm [Dou14].
The algorithm makes a minimum payment if one or more attempted answers in the gold standard are
wrong. Note that this property is significantly stronger than the property of no-free-lunch which we origi-
nally required, where we wanted a minimum payment only when all attempted answers were wrong. Sur-
prisingly, as we prove shortly, Algorithm 1 is the only incentive-compatible mechanism that satisfies no-
free-lunch.
The following theorem shows that this mechanism indeed incentivizes a worker to skip the questions for
which her confidence is below T , while answering those for which her confidence is greater than T . In the
latter case, the worker is incentivized to select the answer which she thinks is most likely to be correct.
Theorem 2 The mechanism of Algorithm 1 is incentive-compatible and satisfies the no-free-lunch condition.
In the remainder of this subsection, we present the proof of Theorem 2. The reader may go directly to
subsection 3.3 without loss in continuity.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proposed payment mechanism satisfies the no-free-lunch condition since the
payment is µmin when there are one or more wrong answers in the gold standard. It remains to show that the
mechanism is incentive compatible. To this end, observe that the property of incentive-compatibility does
not change upon any shift of the mechanism by a constant value or any scaling by a positive constant value.
As a result, for the purposes of this proof, we can assume without loss of generality that µmin = 0.
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We will first assume that, for every question that the worker does not skip, she selects the answer which
she believes is most likely to be correct. Under this assumption we will show that the worker is incentivized
to skip the questions for which her confidence is smaller than T and attempt if it is greater than T . Finally,
we will show that the mechanism indeed incentivizes the worker to select the answer which she believes is
most likely to be correct for the questions that she doesn’t skip. In what follows, we will employ the notation
κ = µmaxT
G.
Let us first consider the case when G = N . Let p1, . . . , pN be the confidences of the worker for to
questions 1, . . . , N respectively. Further, let p(1) ≥ · · · ≥ p(m) > T > p(m+1) ≥ · · · ≥ p(N) be the ordered
permutation of these confidences (for some number m). Let {(1), . . . , (N)} denote the corresponding per-
mutation of the N questions. If the mechanism is incentive compatible, then the expected payment received
by this worker should be maximized when the worker answers questions (1), . . . , (m) and skips the rest.
Under the mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1, this action fetches the worker an expected payment of
κ
p(1)
T
· · · p(m)
T
.
Alternatively, if the worker answers the questions {i1, . . . , iz}, with pi1 < · · · < piy < T < piy+1 < · · · piz ,
then the expected payment is
pi1 · · · piz
κ
T z
= κ
pi1
T
· · · piz
T
(1)
≤ κpi1
T
· · · piy
T
(2)
≤ κp(1)
T
· · · p(m)
T
(3)
where inequality (2) holds because
pij
T ≤ 1 ∀ j > y and holds with equality only when z = y. Inequality (3)
is a result of
p(j)
T ≥ 1 ∀ j ≤ m and holds with equality only when y = m. It follows that the expected
payment is (strictly) maximized when i1 = (1), . . . , iz = (m) as required.
The case of G < N is a direct consequence of the result for G = N , as follows. When G < N ,
from a worker’s point of view, the set of G questions is distributed uniformly at random in the superset
of N questions. However, for every set of G questions, the relations (1), (2), (3) and their associated
equality/strict-inequality conditions hold. The expected payment is thus (strictly) maximized when the
worker answers the questions for which her confidence is greater than T and skips those for which her
confidence is smaller than T .
One can see that for every question that the worker chooses to answer, the expected payment increases
with an increase in her confidence. Thus, the worker is incentivized to select the answer that she thinks is
most probably correct.
Finally, since κ = µmaxTG > 0 and T ∈ (0, 1), the payment is always non-negative and satisfies the
µmax-budget constraint.
3.3 Uniqueness of this Mechanism
While we started out with a very weak condition of no-free-lunch of that requires a minimum payment when
all attempted answers are wrong, the mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1 is significantly more strict and
pays the minimum amount when any of the attempted answers is wrong. A natural question that arises is:
can we design an alternative mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility and no-free-lunch that operates
somewhere in between? The following theorem answers this question in the negative.
Theorem 3 The mechanism of Algorithm 1 is the only incentive-compatible mechanism that satisfies the
no-free-lunch condition.
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Theorem 3 gives a strong result despite imposing very weak requirements. To see this, recall our earlier
discussion on deterring spammers, that is, incurring a low expenditure on workers who answer randomly.
For instance, when the task comprises binary-choice questions, one may wish to design mechanisms which
make the minimum possible payment when the responses to 50% or more of the questions in the gold
standard are incorrect. The no-free-lunch axiom is a much weaker requirement, and the only mechanism
that can satisfy this requirement is the mechanism of Algorithm 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is based on the following key lemma, establishing a condition that any incentive-
compatible mechanism must necessarily satisfy. Note that this lemma does not require the no-free-lunch
condition.
Lemma 4 Any incentive-compatible mechanism f must satisfy, for every gold standard question i ∈ {1, . . . , G}
and every (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}G−1,
Tf(y1, . . . , yi−1, 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− T )f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−1, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) .
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix A.1. Using this lemma, we will now prove Theorem 3. The
reader interested in further results and not the proof may feel free to jump to Subsection 3.4 without any loss
in continuity.
Proof of Theorem 3. The property of incentive-compatibility does not change upon any shift of the mech-
anism by a constant value or any scaling by a positive constant value. As a result, for the purposes of this
proof, we can assume without loss of generality that µmin = 0.
We will first prove that any incentive-compatible mechanism satisfying the no-free-lunch condition must
make a zero payment if one or more answers in the gold standard are incorrect. The proof proceeds by
induction on the number of skipped questions S in the gold standard. Let us assume for now that in the G
questions in the gold standard, the first question is answered incorrectly, the next (G − 1 − S) questions
are answered by the worker and have arbitrary evaluations, and the remaining S questions are skipped. The
proof proceeds by an induction on S. Suppose S = G − 1. In this case, the only attempted question is
the first question and the answer provided by the worker to this question is incorrect. The no-free-lunch
condition necessitates a zero payment in this case, thus satisfying the base case of our induction hypothesis.
Now we prove the hypothesis for some S under the assumption of it being true when the number of questions
skipped in the gold standard is (S + 1) or more. From Lemma 4 (with i = G− S − 1) we have
Tf(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T )f(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
= f(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
= 0,
where the final equation is a consequence of our induction hypothesis: The induction hypothesis is appli-
cable since f(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2, 0, 0, . . . , 0) corresponds to the case when the last (S + 1) questions are
skipped and the first question is answered incorrectly. Now, since the payment f must be non-negative and
since T ∈ (0, 1), it must be that
f(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0,
and
f(−1, y2, . . . , yG−S−2,−1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0.
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This completes the proof of our induction hypothesis. Furthermore, each of the arguments above hold for
any permutation of the G questions, thus proving the necessity of zero payment when any one or more
answers are incorrect.
We will now prove that when no answers in the gold standard are incorrect, the payment must be of the
form described in Algorithm 1. Let κ be the payment when all G questions in the gold standard are skipped.
LetC be the number questions answered correctly in the gold standard. Since there are no incorrect answers,
it follows that the remaining (G−C) questions are skipped. Let us assume for now that the first C questions
are answered correctly and the remaining (G − C) questions are skipped. We repeatedly apply Lemma 4,
and the fact that the payment must be zero when one or more answers are wrong, to get
f(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−C
) =
1
T
f(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−C
)− 1− T
T
f(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C−1
,−1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−C
)
=
1
T
f(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−C
)
...
=
1
TC
f(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
)
=
1
TC
κ .
In order to abide by the budget, we must have the maximum payment as µmax = κ 1TG . It follows that
κ = µmaxT
G. Finally, the arguments above hold for any permutation of the G questions, thus proving the
uniqueness of the mechanism of Algorithm 1.
3.4 Optimality against Spamming Behavior
As discussed earlier, crowdsouring tasks, especially those with multiple choice questions, often encounter
spammers who answer randomly without heed to the question being asked. For instance, under a binary-
choice setup, a spammer will choose one of the two options uniformly at random for every question. A
highly desirable objective in crowdsourcing settings is to deter spammers. To this end, one may wish to
impose a condition of making the minimum possible payment when the responses to 50% or more of the
attempted questions in the gold standard are incorrect. A second desirable metric could be to minimize
the expenditure on a worker who simply skips all questions. While the aforementioned requirements were
deterministic functions of the worker’s responses, one may alternatively wish to impose requirements that
depend on the distribution of the worker’s answering process. For instance, a third desirable feature would
be to minimize the expected payment to a worker who answers all questions uniformly at random. We now
show that interestingly, our unique multiplicative payment mechanism simultaneously satisfies all these
requirements. The result is stated assuming a multiple-choice setup, but extends trivially to non-multiple-
choice settings.
Theorem 5.A (Distributional) Consider any value A ∈ {0, . . . , G}. Among all incentive-compatible
mechanisms (that may or may not satisfy no-free-lunch), Algorithm 1 strictly minimizes the expenditure on
a worker who skips some A of the questions in the the gold standard, and chooses answers to the remaining
(G−A) questions uniformly at random.
Theorem 5.B (Deterministic) Consider any value B ∈ (0, 1]. Among all incentive-compatible mecha-
nisms (that may or may not satisfy no-free-lunch), Algorithm 1 strictly minimizes the expenditure on a
worker who gives incorrect answers to a fractionB or more of the questions attempted in the gold standard.
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We see from this result that the multiplicative payment mechanism of Algorithm 1 thus possesses very useful
properties geared to deter spammers, while ensuring that a good worker will be paid a high enough amount.
To illustrate this point, let us compare the mechanism of Algorithm 1 with the popular additive class of
payment mechanisms.
Example 1 Consider the popular class of “additive” mechanisms, where the payments to a worker are
added across the gold standard questions. This additive payment mechanism offers a reward of µmaxG for
every correct answer in the gold standard, µmaxTG for every question skipped, and 0 for every incorrect
answer. Importantly, the final payment to the worker is the sum of the rewards across the G gold standard
questions. One can verify that this additive mechanism is incentive compatible. One can also see that that
as guaranteed by our theory, this additive payment mechanism does not satisfy the no-free-lunch axiom.
Suppose each question involves choosing from two options. Let us compute the expenditure that these
two mechanisms make under a spamming behavior of choosing the answer randomly to each question.
Given the 50% likelihood of each question being correct, on can compute that the additive mechanism
makes a payment of µmax2 in expectation. On the other hand, our mechanism pays an expected amount of
only µmax2−G. The payment to spammers thus reduces exponentially with the number of gold standard
questions under our mechanism, whereas it does not reduce at all in the additive mechanism.
Now, consider a different means of exploiting the mechanism(s) where the worker simply skips all ques-
tions. To this end, observe that if a worker skips all the questions then the additive payment mechanism will
incur an expenditure of µmaxT . On the other hand, the proposed payment mechanism of Algorithm 1 pays
an exponentially smaller amount of µmaxTG (recall that T < 1).
We prove Theorem 5 in the rest of this subsection. The reader may feel free to jump directly to Section 4
without any loss in continuity.
Proof of Theorem 5. The property of incentive-compatibility does not change upon any shift of the mech-
anism by a constant value or any scaling by a positive constant value. As a result, for the purposes of this
proof, we can assume without loss of generality that µmin = 0.
Part A (Distributional). Let m denote the number of options in each question. One can verify that
under the mechanism of Algorithm 1, a worker who skips A questions and answers the rest uniformly at
random will get a payment of µmaxT
A
mG−A in expectation. This expression arises due to the fact that Algorithm 1
makes a zero payment if any of the attempted answers are incorrect, and a payment of µmaxTA if the worker
skips A questions and answers the rest correctly. Under uniformly random answers, the probability of the
latter event is 1
mG−A .
Now consider any other mechanism, and denote it as f ′. Let us suppose without loss of generality
that the worker attempts the first (G − A) questions. Since the payment must be non-negative, a repeated
application of Lemma 4 gives
f ′(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−A
, 0, . . . , 0) ≥ Tf ′(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
G−A+1
, 0, . . . , 0) (4)
...
≥ TAf ′(1, . . . , 1)
= TAµmax, (5)
where (5) is a result of the µmax-budget constraint. Since there is a 1mG−A chance of the (G−A) attempted
answers being correct, the expected payment under any other mechanism f ′ must be at least µmaxT
A
mG−A .
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We will now show that if any mechanism f ′ that makes an expected payment of µmaxT
A
mG−A to such a
spammer, then the mechanism must be identical to Algorithm 1. We split the proof of this part into two
cases, depending on the value of the parameter A.
Case I (A < G): In order to make an expected payment of µmaxT
A
mG−A , the mechanism must achieve the
bound (5) with equality, and furthermore, the mechanism must have zero payment if any of the (G − A)
attempted questions are answered incorrectly. In other words, the mechanism f ′ under consideration must
satisfy
f ′(y1, . . . , yG−A, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 ∀(y1, . . . , yG−A) ∈ {−1, 1}G−A\{1}G−A.
A repeated application of Lemma 4 then implies
f ′(0, 0, . . . ,−1) = 0. (6)
Note that so far we considered the case when the worker attempts the first (G−A) questions. The arguments
above hold for any choice of the (G − A) attempted questions, and consequently the results shown so far
in this proof hold for all permutations of the arguments to f ′. In particular, the mechanism f ′ must make a
zero payment when any (G − 1) questions in the gold standard are skipped and the remaining question is
answered incorrectly. Another repeated application of Lemma 4 to this result gives
f ′(y1, . . . , yG) = 0 ∀(y1, . . . , yG) ∈ {0,−1}G\{0}G.
This condition is precisely the no-free-lunch axiom, and in Theorem 3 we had shown that Algorithm 1 is the
only incentive-compatible mechanism that satisfies this axiom. It follows that our mechanism, Algorithm 1
strictly minimizes the expected payment in the setting under consideration.
Case II (A = G): In order to achieve the bound (5) with equality, the mechanism f ′ must also achieve
the bound (4) with equality. Noting that we have A = G in this case, it follows that the mechanism f ′ must
satisfy
f ′(−1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0.
This condition is identical to (6) established for Case I earlier, and the rest of the argument now proceeds in
a manner identical to the subsequent arguments in Case I.
Part B (Deterministic). Given our result of Theorem 3, the proof for the deterministic part is straight-
forward. Algorithm 1 makes a payment of zero when one or more of the answers to questions in the gold
standard are incorrect. Consequently, for every value of parameter B ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 1 makes a zero
payment when a fraction B or more of the attempted answers are incorrect. Any other mechanism do-
ing so must satisfy the no-free-lunch axiom. In Theorem 3 we had shown that Algorithm 1 is the only
incentive-compatible mechanism that satisfies this axiom. It follows that our mechanism, Algorithm 1,
strictly minimizes the payment in the event under consideration.
4 Confidence-based Setting
In this section, we will discuss incentive mechanisms when the worker is asked to select from more than
one confidence-level for every question (Figure 1c). In particular, for some L ≥ 1, the worker is asked to
indicate a confidence-level in the range {0, . . . , L} for every answer. Level 0 is the ‘skip’ level, and level L
denotes the highest confidence. Note that we do not solicit an answer if the worker indicates a confidence-
level of 0 (skip), but the worker must provide an answer if she indicates a confidence-level of 1 or higher.
This makes the case of having only a ‘skip’ as considered in Section 3 a special case of this setting, and
corresponds to L = 1.
We generalize the requirement of no-free-lunch to the confidence-based setting as follows.
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Axiom 6 (Generalized-no-free-lunch axiom) If all the answers attempted by the worker in the gold stan-
dard are selected as the highest confidence-level (level L), and all of them turn out to be wrong, then the
payment is µmin. More formally, we require the mechanism f to satisfy f(x1, . . . , xG) = µmin for every
evaluation (x1, . . . , xG) that satisfies 0 <
∑G
i=1 1{xi 6= 0} =
∑G
i=1 1{xi = −L}.
In the confidence-based setting, we require specification of a set of thresholds {Sl, Tl}Ll=1 that determine
the confidence-levels that the workers should indicate. In particular, we will require specification of two
reference points for each confidence level, and this specification generalizes the skip-based setting.
• The first set of thresholds specifies a comparison of any confidence level with the skipping option as
a fixed reference. To this end, recall that in the skip-based setting, the threshold T specified when
the worker should skip a question and when she should attempt to answer. This is generalized to the
confidence-based setting where for every level l ∈ [L], a fixed threshold Sl specifies the ‘strength’ of
confidence-level l: If restricted to only the two options of skipping or selecting confidence-level l for
any question, the worker should be incentivized to select confidence-level l if her confidence is higher
than Sl and skip if her confidence is lower than Sl.
• The second set of thresholds specifies a comparison of any confidence level with its neighbors. If
a worker decides to not skip a question, she must choose one of multiple confidence-levels. A set
{Tl}Ll=1 of thresholds specify the boundaries between different confidence-levels. In particular, when
the confidence of the worker for a question lies in (Tl−1, Tl+1), then the worker must be incentivized
to indicate confidence-level (l− 1) if her confidence is lower than Tl and to indicate confidence-level
l if her confidence is higher than Tl. This includes selecting level L if her confidence is higher than
TL and selecting level 0 if her confidence is lower than T1.
We will call a payment mechanism as incentive-compatible if it satisfies the two requirements listed above,
and also incentivizes the worker to select the answer that she believes is most likely to be correct for every
question for which her confidence is higher than T1.
The problem setting inherently necessitates certain restrictions in the choice of the thresholds. Since we
require the worker to choose a higher level when her confidence is higher, the thresholds must necessarily
be monotonic and satisfy 0 < S1 < S2 < · · · < SL < 1 and 0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < TL < 1. Also observe
that the definitions of S1 and T1 coincide, and hence S1 = T1. Additionally, we can show (Proposition 17 in
Appendix A.5) that for incentive-compatible mechanisms to exist, it must be that Tl > Sl ∀ l ∈ {2, . . . , L}.
As a result, the thresholds must also satisfy T1 = S1, T2 > S2, . . . , TL > SL. These thresholds may be
chosen based on various factors of the problem at hand, for example, on the post-processing algorithms, any
statistics on the distribution of worker abilities, budget constraints, etc. In this paper, we will assume that
these values are given to us.
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4.1 Payment Mechanism
The proposed payment mechanism is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Incentive mechanism for the confidence-based setting
• Inputs:
I Thresholds S1, . . . , SL and T1, . . . , TL
I Budget parameters µmax and µmin
I Evaluations (x1, . . . , xG) ∈ {−L, . . . ,+L}G of the worker’s answers to the G gold standard questions
• Set α−L, . . . , αL as
I αL =
1
SL
, α−L = 0
I For l ∈ {L− 1, . . . , 1},
αl =
(1− Sl)Tl+1αl+1 + (1− Sl)(1− Tl+1)α−(l+1) − (1− Tl+1)
Tl+1 − Sl and α−l =
1− Slαl
1− Sl
I α0 = 1
• The payment is
f(x1, . . . , xG) = κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + µmin
where κ = (µmax − µmin)
(
1
αL
)G
.
The following theorem shows that this mechanism indeed incentivizes a worker to select answers and
confidence-levels as desired.
Theorem 7 The mechanism of Algorithm 2 is incentive-compatible and satisfies the generalized-no-free-
lunch condition.
The proof of Theorem 7 follows in a manner similar to that of the proof of Theorem 2, and is provided in
Appendix A.2.
Remark 1 The mechanism of Algorithm 2 also ensures a condition stronger than the ‘boundary-based’
definition of the thresholds {Tl}l∈[L] given earlier. Under this mechanism, for every l ∈ [L−1] the worker is
incentivized to select confidence-level l (over all else) whenever her confidence lies in the interval (Tl, Tl+1),
select confidence-level 0 (over all else) whenever her confidence is lower than T1 and select confidence-level
L (over all else) whenever her confidence is higher than TL.
4.2 Uniqueness of this Mechanism
We prove that the mechanism of Algorithm 2 is unique, that is, no other incentive-compatible mechanism
can satisfy the generalized-no-free-lunch condition.
Theorem 8 The payment mechanism of Algorithm 2 is the only incentive-compatible mechanism that satis-
fies the generalized-no-free-lunch condition.
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The proof of Theorem 8 is provided in Appendix A.3. The proof is conceptually similar to that of
Theorem 8 but involves resolving several additional complexities that arise due to elicitation from multiple
confidence levels.
5 A Stronger No-free-lunch Condition: Impossibility Results
Recall that the no-free-lunch axiom under the skip-based mechanism of Section 3 requires the payment to
be the minimum possible if all attempted answers in the gold standard are incorrect. However, a worker
who skips all the questions may still receive a payment. The generalization under the confidence-based
mechanism of Section 4 requires the payment to be the minimum possible if all attempted answers in the
gold standard were selected with the highest confidence-level and were incorrect. However, a worker who
marked all questions with a lower confidence level may be paid even if her answers to all the questions in the
gold standard turn out to be incorrect. One may thus wish to impose a stronger requirement instead, where
the minimum payment is made to workers who make no useful contribution. This is the primary focus of
this section.
Consider the skip-based setting. Define the following axiom which is slightly stronger than the no-free-
lunch axiom defined previously.
Strong-no-free-lunch: If none of the answers in the gold standard are correct, then the payment is µmin.
More formally, strong-no-free-lunch imposes the condition f(x1, . . . , xG) = µmin for every evaluation
(x1, . . . , xG) that satisfies
∑G
i=1 1{xi > 0} = 0.
The strong-no-free-lunch axiom is only slightly stronger than the no-free-lunch axiom proposed in Sec-
tion 3 for the skip-based setting. The strong-no-free-lunch condition can equivalently be written as imposing
requiring the payment to be the minimum possible for every evaluation that satisfies
∑G
i=1 1{xi 6= 0} =∑G
i=1 1{xi = −1}. From this interpretation, one can see that to the set of events necessitating the min-
imum payment under the no-free-lunch axiom, the strong-no-free-lunch axiom adds only one extra event,
the event of the worker skipping all questions. Unfortunately, it turns out that this minimal strengthening of
the requirements is associated to impossibility results.
In this section we show that no mechanism satisfying the strong-no-free-lunch axiom can be incentive
compatible in general. The only exception is the case when (a) all questions are in the gold standard (G =
N ), and (b) it is guaranteed that the worker has a confidence greater than T for at least one of the N
questions. These conditions are, however, impractical for the crowdsourcing setup under consideration in
this paper. We will first prove the impossibility results under the strong-no-free-lunch axiom. For the sake of
completeness (and also to satisfy mathematical curiosity), we will then provide a (unique) mechanism that
is incentive-compatible and satisfies the strong-no-free-lunch axiom for the skip-based setting under the two
conditions listed above. The proofs of each of the claims made in this section are provided in Appendix A.6.
Let us continue to discuss the skip-based setting. In this section, we will call any worker whose con-
fidences for all of the N questions is lower than T as an unknowledgeable worker, and call the worker a
knowledgeable worker otherwise.
Proposition 9 No payment mechanism satisfying the strong-no-free-lunch condition can incentivize an un-
knowledgeable worker to skip all questions. As a result, no mechanism satisfying the strong-no-free-lunch
axiom can be incentive-compatible.
The proof of this proposition, and that of all other theoretical claims made in this section, are presented in
Appendix A.6.
The impossibility result of Proposition 9 relies on trying to incentivize an unknowledgeable worker to
act as desired. Since no mechanism can be incentive compatible for unknowledgeable workers, we will now
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consider only workers who are knowledgeable. The following proposition shows that the strong-no-free-
lunch condition is too strong even for this relaxed setting.
Proposition 10 When G < N , there exists no mechanism that is incentive-compatible for knowledgeable
workers and satisfies the strong-no-free-lunch condition.
Given this impossibility result for G < N , we are left with G = N which means that the true answers
to all the questions are known apriori. This condition is clearly not applicable to a crowdsourcing setup;
nevertheless, it is mathematically interesting and may be applicable to other scenarios such as testing and
elicitation of beliefs about future events.
Proposition 11 below presents a mechanism for this case and proves its uniqueness. We previously saw
that an unknowledgeable worker cannot be incentivized to skip all the questions (even when G = N ). Thus,
in our payment mechanism, we do the next best thing: Incentivize the unknowledgeable worker to answer
only one question, that which she is most confident about, while incentivizing the knowledgeable worker
to answer questions for which her confidence is greater than T and skip those for which her confidence is
smaller than T .
Proposition 11 Let C be the number of correct answers and W be the number of wrong answers (in the
gold standard). Let the payment be µmin if W > 0 or C = 0, and be (µmax − µmin)TG−C + µmin
otherwise. Under this mechanism, whenG = N , an unknowledgeable worker is incentivized to answer only
one question, that for which her confidence is the maximum, and a knowledgeable worker is incentivized to
answer the questions for which her confidence is greater than T and skip those for which her confidence is
smaller than T . Furthermore, when G = N , this mechanism is the one and only mechanism that obeys the
strong-no-free-lunch condition and is incentive-compatible for knowledgeable workers.
The following proposition shows that the strong-no-free-lunch condition leads to negative results in the
confidence-based setting (L > 1) as well. The strong-no-free-lunch condition is still defined as in the
beginning of Section 5, i.e., the payment is zero if none of the answers are correct.
Proposition 12 When L > 1, for any values of N and G (≤ N), it is impossible for any mechanism to
satisfy the strong-no-free-lunch condition and be incentive-compatible even when the worker is knowledge-
able.
6 Simulations and Experiments
In this section, we present synthetic simulations and real-world experiments to evaluate the effects of our
setting and our mechanism on the final label quality.
6.1 Synthetic Simulations
We employ synthetic simulations to understand the effects of various distributions of the confidences and
labeling errors. We consider binary-choice questions in this set of simulations. Whenever a worker answers
a question, her confidence for the correct answer is drawn from a distribution P independent of all else. We
investigate the effects of the following five choices of the distribution P:
• The uniform distribution on the support [0.5, 1].
• A triangular distribution with lower end-point 0.2, upper end-point 1 and a mode of 0.6.
• A beta distribution with parameter values α = 5 and β = 1.
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Figure 2: Error under different interfaces for synthetic simulations of five distributions of the workers’ error
probabilities.
• The hammer-spammer distribution [KOS11]: uniform on the discrete set {0.5, 1}.
• A truncated Gaussian distribution: a truncation of N (0.75, 0.5) to the interval [0, 1].
We compare (a) the setting where workers attempt every question, with (b) the setting where workers
skip questions for which their confidence is below a certain threshold T . In this set of simulations, we set
T = 0.75. In either setting, we aggregate the labels obtained from the workers for each question via a
majority vote on the two classes. Ties are broken by choosing one of the two options uniformly at random.
Figure 2 depicts the results from these simulations. Each bar represents the fraction of questions that
are labeled incorrectly, and is an average across 50,000 trials. (The standard error of the mean is too small
to be visible.) We see that the skip-based setting consistently outperforms the conventional setting, and the
gains obtained are moderate to high depending on the underlying distribution of the workers’ errors. In
particular, the gains are quite striking under the hammer-spammer model: this result is not surprising since
the mechanism (ideally) screens the spammers out and leaves only the hammers who answer perfectly.
The setup of the simulations described above assumes that the workers confidences equal the true error
probabilities. In practice, however, the workers may have incorrect beliefs. The setup also assumes that
ties are broken randomly; however in practice, ties may be broken in a more systematic manner by eliciting
additional labels for only these hard questions. We now present a second set of simulations that mitigates
these biases. In particular, when a worker has a confidence of p, the actual probability of error is assumed
to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean p and standard deviation 0.1, truncated to [0, 1]. In
addition, when evaluating the performance of the majority voting procedure, we consider a tie as having
an error of 0.4. Figure 3 depicts the results of these simulations. We observe that the results from these
simulations are very similar to those obtained in the earlier simulation setup of Figure 2.
6.2 Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk
We conducted preliminary experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk commercial crowdsourcing plat-
form (mturk.com) to evaluate our proposed scheme in real-world scenarios. The complete data, including
the interface presented to the workers in each of the tasks, the results obtained from the workers, and the
ground truth solutions, are available on the website of the first author.
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Figure 3: Errors under a model that is a perturbation of the first experiment, where the worker’s confidence
is a noisy version of the true error probability and where ties are considered different from random decisions.
6.2.1 Goal
Before delving into details, we first note certain caveats relating to such a study of mechanism design on
crowdsourcing platforms. When a worker encounters a mechanism for only a small amount of time (a
handful of tasks in typical research experiments) and for a small amount of money (at most a few dollars
in typical crowdsourcing tasks), we cannot expect the worker to completely understand the mechanism and
act precisely as required. For instance, we wouldn’t expect our experimental results to change significantly
even upon moderate modifications in the promised amounts, and furthermore, we do expect the outcomes to
be noisy. Incentive compatibility kicks in when the worker encounters a mechanism across a longer term,
for example, when a proposed mechanism is adopted as a standard for a platform, or when higher amounts
are involved. This is when we would expect workers or others (e.g., bloggers or researchers) to design
strategies that can game the mechanism. The theoretical guarantee of incentive compatibility then prevents
such gaming in the long run.
We thus regard these experiments as preliminary. Our intentions towards this experimental exercise
were (a) to evaluate the potential of our algorithms to work in practice, (b) to investigate the effect of the
proposed algorithms on the net error in the collected labelled data, and (c) to identify if there is any major
issue of dissatisfaction among the workers.
6.2.2 Experimental setup
We conducted our experiments on the “Amazon Mechanical Turk” commercial crowdsourcing platform
(mturk.com). On this platform, individuals or businesses (called ‘requesters’) can post tasks, and any in-
dividual (called a ‘worker’) may complete the task over the Internet in exchange for a pre-specified payment.
The payment may comprise of two parts: a fixed component which is identical for all workers performing
that task, and a ‘bonus’ which may be different for different workers and is paid at the discretion of the
requester.
We designed nine experiments (tasks) ranging from image annotation to text and speech recognition.
The individual experiments are described in more detail in Appendix B. All experiments involved objective
questions, and the responses elicited were multiple choice in five of the experiments and freeform text in
the rest. For each experiment, we tested three settings: (i) the baseline conventional setting (Figure 1a)
with a mechanism of paying a fixed amount per correct answer, (ii) our skip-based setting (Figure 1b)
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with our multiplicative mechanism, and (iii) our confidence-based setting (Figure 1c) with our confidence-
based mechanism. For each mechanism in each experiment, we specified the requirement of 35 workers
independently performing the task. This amounts to a total of 945 worker-tasks (315 worker-tasks for each
mechanism). We also set the following constraints for a worker to attempt our tasks: the worker must have
completed at least 100 tasks previously, and must have a history of having at least 95% of her prior work
approved by the respective requesters. In each experiment, we offered a certain small fixed payment (in
order to attract the workers in the first place) and executed the variable part of our mechanisms via a bonus
payment.
6.2.3 Results: Raw data
Figure 4 plots, for the baseline, skip-based and confidence-based mechanisms for all nine experiments,
the (i) fraction of questions that were answered incorrectly, (ii) fraction of questions that were answered
incorrectly among those that were attempted, (iii) the average payment to a worker (in cents), and (iv) break
up of the answers in terms of the fraction of answers in each confidence level. The payment for various tasks
plotted in Figure 4 is computed as the average of the payments across 100 (random) selections of the gold
standard questions, in order to prevent any distortion of the results due to the randomness in the choice of
the gold standard questions.
The figure shows that the amount of errors among the attempted questions is much lower in the skip and
the confidence-based settings than the baseline setting. Also observe that in the confidence-based setting,
as expected, the answers selected with higher confidence-levels are more correct. The total expenditure
under each of these settings is similar, with the skip and the confidence-based settings faring better in most
cases. We also elicited feedback from the workers, in which we received several positive comments (and
no negative comments). Examples of comments that we received: “I was wondering if it would possible to
increase the maximum number of HITs I may complete for you. As I said before, they were fun to complete.
I think I did a good job completing them, and it would be great to complete some more for you.”; “I am
eagerly waiting for your bonus.”; “Enjoyable. Thanks.”
6.2.4 Results: Aggregated data
We saw in the previous section that under the skip-based setting, the amount of error among the attempted
questions was significantly lower than the amount of error in the baseline setting. However, the skip-based
setting was also associated, by design, to lesser amount of data by virtue of questions being skipped by the
workers. A natural question that arises is how the baseline and the skip-based mechanisms will compare in
terms of the final data quality, i.e., the amount of error once data from multiple workers is aggregated.
To this end, we considered the five experiments that consisted of multiple-choice questions. We let a
parameter num workers take values in {3, 5, 7, 9, 11}. For each of the five experiments and for each
of the five values of num workers, we perform the following actions 1,000 times: for each question, we
choose num workers workers and perform a majority vote on their responses. If the correct answer for
that question does not lie in the set of options given by the majority, we consider it as an accuracy of zero.
Otherwise, if there are m options tied in the majority vote, and the correct answer is one of these m, then
we consider it as an accuracy of 100m % (hence, 100% if the correct answer is the only answer picked by the
majority vote). We average the accuracy across all questions and across all iterations.
We choose majority voting as the means of aggregation since (a) it is the simplest and still most popular
aggregation method, and (b) to enable an apples-to-apples comparison design since while more advanced
aggregation algorithms have been developed for the baseline setting without the skip [RYZ+10, ZPBM12,
WJ11, CBCTH13, KHH12, DS79, KOS11, LPI12, VVV14, ZCZJ14, IPSW14], design of analogous algo-
rithms for the new skip-based setting hasn’t been explored yet.
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The results are presented in Figure 5. We see that in most cases, our skip-based mechanism induces a
lower labelling error at the aggregate level than the baseline. Furthermore, in many of the instances, the
reduction is two-fold or higher.
All in all, in the experiments, we observe a substantial reduction in the error-rates while expending
the same or lower amounts and receiving no negative comments from the workers, suggesting that these
mechanisms can work; the fundamental theory underlying the mechanisms ensures that the system cannot
be gamed in the long run. Our proposed settings and mechanisms thus have the potential to provide much
higher quality labeled data as input to machine learning algorithms.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this concluding section, we first discuss the modelling assumptions that we made in this paper, followed
by a discussion on future work and concluding remarks.
7.1 Modelling Assumptions
When forming the model for our problem, as in any other field of theoretical research, we had to make
certain assumptions and choices. In what follows, we discuss the reasons for the modelling choices we
made.
• Use of gold standard questions. We assume the existence of gold standard questions in the task, i.e.,
a subset of questions to which the answers are known to the system designer. The existence of gold
standard is commonplace in crowdsourcing platforms [LEHB10, CMBN11].
• Workers aiming to maximize their expected payments: We assume that the workers aim to maximize their
expected payments. In many other problems in game theory, one often makes the assumption that people
are “risk-averse”, and aim to maximize the expected value of some “utility function” of their payments.
While we extend our results to general utility functions in Appendix C in order to accommodate such
requirements, we also think that the assumption of workers maximizing their expected payments is a
perfectly reasonable assumption for the crowdsourcing settings considered here. The reason is that each
such task lasts for a handful of minutes and is worth a few tens of cents. Workers typically perform tens
to hundreds of tasks per day, and consequently their empirical hourly wages very quickly converge to
their expectation.
• Workers knowing their confidences: We understand that in practice the workers will have noisy or gran-
ular estimates of their own beliefs. The mathematical assumption of workers knowing their precise con-
fidences is an idealization intended for mathematical tractability. This is one of the reasons why we only
elicit a quantized value of the workers’ beliefs (in terms of skipping or choosing one of a finite number
of confidence levels), and not try to ask for a precise value.
• Eliciting a quantized version of the beliefs: We do not directly attempt to elicit the values of the beliefs
of the workers, but instead ask them to indicate only a quantization (e.g., “I’m not sure” or “moderately
confident”, etc.). We prefer this quantization to direct assessment to real-valued probability, motivated by
the extensive literature in psychology on the coarseness of human perception and processing (e.g., [Mil56,
SN94, JL13, SBB+15]) establishing that humans are more comfortable at providing quantized responses.
This notion is verified by experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk in [SBB+15] where it is observed
that people are more consistent when giving ordinal answers (comparing pairs of items) as opposed to
when they are asked for numeric evaluations.
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Figure 4: The error-rates in the raw data and payments in the nine experiments. Each individual bar in the
plots corresponds to one mechanism in one experiment and is generated from 35 distinct workers (this totals
to 945 worker-tasks).
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Figure 5: Error-rates in the aggregated data in the five experiments involving multiple-choice tasks.
7.2 Open problems
We discuss two sets of open problems, one from the practical perspective and another on the theoretical
front.
First, in the paper, we assumed that the number of total questions N in a task, the number of gold stan-
dard questionsG, and the threshold T for skipping (or the number and thresholds of the different confidence
levels) were provided to the mechanism. While these parameters may be chosen by hand by a system de-
signer based on her own experience, a more principled design of these parameters is an important question.
The choices for these parameters may have to be made based on certain tradeoffs. For instance, a higher
value ofG reduces the variance in the payments but uses more resources in terms of gold standard questions.
Or for instance, more number of threshold levels Lwould increase the amount of information obtained about
the workers’ beliefs, but also increase the noise in the workers’ estimates of her own beliefs.
A second open problem is the design of inference algorithms that can exploit the specific structure of
the skip-based setting. There are several algorithms and theoretical analyses in the literature for aggregating
data from multiple workers in the baseline setting [RYZ+10, ZPBM12, WJ11, CBCTH13, KHH12, DS79,
KOS11, LPI12, VVV14, ZCZJ14, IPSW14]. A useful direction of research in the future is to develop
algorithms and theoretical guarantees that incorporate information about the workers’ confidences. For
instance, for the skip-based setting, the missing labels are not missing “at random” but are correlated with
the difficulty of the task; in the confidence-based setting, we elicit information about the workers’ perceived
confidence levels. Designing algorithms that can exploit this information judiciously (e.g., via confidence-
weighed worker/item constraints in the minimax entropy method of [ZPBM12]) is a useful direction of
future research.
7.3 Conclusions
Despite remarkable progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence, many problems are still not
solvable by either humans or machines alone. In recent years, crowdsourcing has emerged as a powerful
tool to combine both human and machine intelligence. Crowdsourcing is also a standard means of collecting
labeled data for machine learning algorithms. However, crowdsourcing is often plagued with the problem
of poor-quality output from workers.
We designed a reward mechanism for crowdsourcing to ensure collection of high-quality data. Under a
very natural “no-free-lunch” axiom, we mathematically prove that surprisingly, our mechanism is the only
feasible reward mechanism. We further show that among all possible incentive-compatible mechanisms,
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our “multiplicative” mechanism makes the strictly smallest expenditure on spammers. In preliminary ex-
periments, we observe a significant drop in the error rates under this unique mechanism as compared to
basic baseline mechanisms, suggesting that our mechanism has the potential to work well in practice. Our
mechanisms offer some additional benefits. The pattern of skips or confidence levels of the workers pro-
vide a reasonable estimate of the difficulty of each question. In practice, the questions that are estimated
to be more difficult may now be delegated to an expert or to more non-expert workers. Secondly, the the-
oretical guarantees of the mechanism may allow for better post-processing of the data, incorporating the
confidence information and improving the overall accuracy. The simplicity of the rules of our mechanisms
may facilitate an easier adoption among the workers.
In conclusion, given the uniqueness in theory, simplicity, and good performance observed in practice, we
envisage our ‘multiplicative’ mechanisms to be of interest to machine learning researchers and practitioners
who use crowdsourcing to collect labeled data.
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A Proofs
In this section, we prove the claimed theoretical results whose proofs are not included in the main text of
the paper.
The property of incentive-compatibility does not change upon any shift of the mechanism by a constant
value or any scaling by a positive constant value. As a result, for the purposes of these proofs, we can
assume without loss of generality that µmin = 0.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4: The Workhorse Lemma
First we consider the case ofG = N . In the set {y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG}, for some (η, γ) ∈ {0, . . . , G−
1}2, suppose there are η elements with a value 1, γ elements with a value−1, and (G−1− η−γ) elements
with a value 0. Let us assume for now that i = η + γ + 1, y1 = 1, . . . , yη = 1, yη+1 = −1, . . . , yη+γ =
−1, yη+γ+2 = 0, . . . , yG = 0.
Suppose the worker has confidences (p1, . . . , pη+γ) ∈ (T, 1]η+γ for the first (η + γ) questions, a confi-
dence of q ∈ (0, 1] for the next question, and confidences smaller than T for the remaining (G− η− γ − 1)
questions. The mechanism must incentivize the worker to answer the first (η + γ) questions and skip the
last (G− η − γ − 1) questions; for question (η + γ + 1), it must incentivize the worker to answer if q > T
and skip if q < T . Supposing the worker indeed attempts the first (η + γ) questions and skips the last
(G− η− γ− 1) questions, let x = {x1, . . . , xη+γ} ∈ {−1, 1}η+γ denote the the evaluation of the worker’s
answers to the first (η + γ) questions. Define quantities {rj}j∈[η+γ] as rj = 1− pj for j ∈ {1, . . . , η}, and
rj = pj for j ∈ {η + 1, η + γ}. The requirement of incentive compatibility necessitates
q
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ , 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

+ (1− q)
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ ,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

q<T
≶
q>T
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ , 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2
 .
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The left hand side of this expression is the expected payment if the worker chooses to answer question
(η + γ + 1), while the right hand side is the expected payment if she chooses to skip it. For any real-valued
variable q, and for any real-valued constants a, b and c,
aq
q<c
≶
q>c
b ⇒ ac = b .
As a result,
T
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ , 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

+ (1− T )
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ ,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

−
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
f(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2
 = 0.
(7)
The left hand side of (7) represents a polynomial in (η + γ) variables {rj}η+γj=1 which evaluates to zero for
all values of the variables within a (η + γ)-dimensional solid Euclidean ball. Thus, the coefficients of the
monomials in this polynomial must be zero. In particular, the constant term must be zero. The constant term
appears when xj = 1 ∀ j in the summations in (7). Setting the constant term to zero gives
Tf(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
+ (1− T )f(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
− f(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0
as desired. Since the arguments above hold for any permutation of the G questions, this completes the proof
for the case of G = N .
Now consider the case G < N . Let g : {−1, 0, 1}N → R+ represent the expected payment given an
evaluation of all the N answers, when the identities of the gold standard questions are unknown. Here,
the expectation is with respect to the (uniformly random) choice of the G gold standard questions. If
(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N are the evaluations of the worker’s answers to the N questions then the ex-
pected payment is
g(x1, . . . , xN ) =
1(
N
G
) ∑
(i1,...,iG)⊆{1,...,N}
f(xi1 , . . . , xiG) . (8)
Notice that when G = N , the functions f and g are identical.
In the set {y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG}, for some (η, γ) ∈ {0, . . . , G − 1}2 with η + γ < G, suppose
there are η elements with a value 1, γ elements with a value −1, and (G− 1− η− γ) elements with a value
0. Let us assume for now that i = η + γ + 1, y1 = 1, . . . , yη = 1, yη+1 = −1, . . . , yη+γ = −1, yη+γ+2 =
0, . . . , yG = 0.
Suppose the worker has confidences {p1, . . . , pη+γ} ∈ (T, 1]η+γ for the first (η+γ) of theN questions,
a confidence of q ∈ (0, 1] for the next question, and confidences smaller than T for the remaining (N − η−
γ− 1) questions. The mechanism must incentivize the worker to answer the first (η+ γ) questions and skip
the last (N−η−γ−1) questions; for the (η+γ+1)th question, the mechanism must incentivize the worker
to answer if q > T and skip if q < T . Supposing the worker indeed attempts the first (η + γ) questions and
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skips the last (N − η − γ − 1) questions, let x = {x1, . . . , xη+γ} ∈ {−1, 1}η+γ denote the the evaluation
of the worker’s answers to the first (η + γ) questions. Define quantities {rj}j∈[η+γ] as rj = 1 − pj for
j ∈ {1, . . . , η}, and rj = pj for j ∈ {η+ 1, η+ γ}. The requirement of incentive compatibility necessitates
q
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
g(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ , 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

+ (1− q)
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
g(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ ,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2

q<T
≶
q>T
∑
x∈{−1,1}η+γ
g(x1, . . . , xη,−xη+1, . . . ,−xη+γ , 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∏
j∈[η+γ]
r
1−xj
2
j (1− rj)
1+xj
2
 . (9)
Again, applying the fact that for any real-valued variable q and for any real-valued constants a, b and c,
aq
q<c
≶
q>c
b ⇒ ac = b, we get that
Tg(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
+ (1− T )g(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
− g(x1 = 1, . . . , xη = 1,−xη+1 = −1, . . . ,−xη+γ = −1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 . (10)
The proof now proceeds via induction on the quantity (G − η − γ − 1), i.e., on the number of skipped
questions in {y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG}. We begin with the case of (G − η − γ − 1) = G − 1 which
implies η = γ = 0. In this case (10) simplifies to
Tg(1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T )g(−1, 0, . . . , 0) = g(0, 0, . . . , 0) .
Applying the expansion of function g in terms of function f from (8) gives
T (c1f(1, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0)) + (1− T ) (c1f(−1, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0))
= (c1f(0, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0))
for constants c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 that respectively denote the probabilities that the first question is picked
and not picked in the set of G gold standard questions. Cancelling out the common terms on both sides of
the equation, we get the desired result
Tf(1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T )f(−1, 0, . . . , 0) = f(0, 0, . . . , 0) .
Next, we consider the case when (G − η − γ − 1) questions are skipped in the gold standard, and assume
that the result is true when more than (G−η−γ−1) questions are skipped in the gold standard. In (10), the
functions g decompose into a sum of the constituent f functions. These constituent functions f are of two
types: the first where all of the first (η + γ + 1) questions are included in the gold standard, and the second
where one or more of the first (η + γ + 1) questions are not included in the gold standard. The second case
corresponds to situations where there are more than (G− η− γ − 1) questions skipped in the gold standard
and hence satisfies our induction hypothesis. The terms corresponding to these functions thus cancel out in
the expansion of (10). The remainder comprises only evaluations of function f for arguments in which the
first (η + γ + 1) questions are included in the gold standard: since the last (N − η − γ − 1) questions are
skipped by the worker, the remainder evaluates to
Tc3f(y1, . . . , yη+γ , 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T )c3f(y1, . . . , yη+γ ,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
= c3f(y1, . . . , yη+γ , 0, 0, . . . , 0)
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for some constant c3 > 0. Dividing throughout by c3 gives the desired result.
Finally, the arguments above hold for any permutation of the first G questions, thus completing the
proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 7: Working of Algorithm 2
We first state three properties that the constants {αl}Ll=−L defined in Algorithm 2 must satisfy. We will use
these properties subsequently in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 13 For every l ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}
Tl+1αl+1 + (1− Tl+1)α−(l+1) = Tl+1αl + (1− Tl+1)α−l , (11)
and
Sl+1αl+1 + (1− Sl+1)α−(l+1) = α0 = 1 . (12)
Lemma 14 αL > αL−1 > · · · > α−L = 0.
Lemma 15 For any m ∈ {1, . . . , L}, any p > Tm and any z < m,
pαm + (1− p)α−m > pαz + (1− p)α−z , (13)
and for any m ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, any p < Tm+1 and any z > m,
pαm + (1− p)α−m > pαz + (1− p)α−z . (14)
The proof of these results are available at the end of this subsection. Assuming these lemmas hold, we
will now complete the proof of Theorem 7.
The choice of α−L = 0 made in Algorithm 2 ensures that the payment is zero whenever any answer in
the gold standard evaluates to−L. This choice ensures that the no-free-lunch condition is satisfied. One can
easily verify that the payment lies in the interval [0, µmax]. It remains to prove that the proposed mechanism
is incentive-compatible.
Define E = (1, . . . , G) ∈ {−1, 1}G and E\1 = (2, . . . , G). Suppose the worker has confidences
p1, . . . , pN for herN answers. For some (s(1), . . . , s(N)) ∈ {0, . . . , L}N suppose pi ∈ (Ts(i), Ts(i)+1) ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, i.e., s(1), . . . , s(N) are the correct confidence-levels for her answers. Consider any other set
of confidence-levels s′(1), . . . , s′(N). When the mechanism of Algorithm 2 is employed, the expected
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payment (from the point of view of the worker) on selecting confidence-levels s(1), . . . , s(N) is
E[Pay] =
1(
N
G
) ∑
(j1,...,jG)
⊆{1,...,N}
∑
E∈{−1,1}G
G∏
i=1
αis(ji)(pji)
1+i
2 (1− pji)
1−i
2 (15)
=
1(
N
G
) ∑
(j1,...,jG)
⊆{1,...,N}
∑
E\1∈{−1,1}G−1
(
pj1αs(j1) + (1− pj1)α−s(j1)
) G∏
i=2
αis(ji)(pji)
1+i
2 (1− pji)
1−i
2
(16)
...
=
1(
N
G
) ∑
(j1,...,jG)
⊆{1,...,N}
G∏
i=1
(
pjiαs(ji) + (1− pji)α−s(ji)
)
(17)
>
1(
N
G
) ∑
(j1,...,jG)
⊆{1,...,N}
G∏
i=1
(
pjiαs′(ji) + (1− pji)α−s′(ji)
)
(18)
which is the expected payment under any other set of confidence-levels s′(1), . . . , s′(N). The last inequality
is a consequence of Lemma 15.
An argument similar to the above also proves that for anym ∈ {1, . . . , L}, if allowed to choose between
only skipping and confidence-level m, the worker is incentivized to choose confidence-level m over skip if
her confidence is greater Sm, and choose skip over level m if if her confidence is smaller than Sm. Finally,
from Lemma 14 we have αL > · · · > α−L = 0. It follows that the expected payment (17) is strictly
increasing in each of the values p1, . . . , pN . Thus the worker is incentivized to report the answer that she
thinks is most likely to be correct.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 13
Algorithm 2 states that α−l = 1−αlSl1−Sl for all l ∈ [L]. A simple rearrangement of the terms in this expression
gives (12).
Towards the goal of proving (11), we will first prove an intermediate result:
αl > 1 > α−l ∀ l ∈ {L, . . . , 1} . (19)
The proof proceeds via an induction on l ∈ {L, . . . , 2}. The case of l = 1 will be proved separately. The
induction hypothesis involves two claims: αl > 1 > α−l and Tlαl + (1 − Tl)α−l > 1. The base case is
l = L for which we know that αL = 1SL > 1 > 0 = α−L and Tlαl + (1 − Tl)α−l =
Tl
Sl
> 1. Now
suppose that the induction hypothesis is true for (l + 1). Rearranging the terms in the expression defining
αl in Algorithm 2 and noting that 1 > Tl+1 > Sl, we get
αl =
(1− Sl)
(
Tl+1αl+1 + (1− Tl+1)α−(l+1)
)− (1− Tl+1)
(1− Sl)− (1− Tl+1) (20)
>
(1− Sl)− (1− Tl+1)
(1− Sl)− (1− Tl+1) (21)
= 1 . (22)
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From (12) we see that the value 1 is a convex combination of αl and α−l. Since αl > 1 and Sl ∈ (0, 1), it
must be that α−l < 1. Furthermore, since Tl > Sl we get
Tlαl + (1− Tl)α−l > Slαl + (1− Sl)α−l (23)
= 1 . (24)
This proves the induction hypothesis. Let us now consider l = 1. If L = 1 then we have αL = 1SL > 1 >
0 = α−L and we are done. If L > 1 then we have already proved that α2 > 1 > α−2 and T2α2 + (1 −
T2)α−2 > 1. An argument identical to (20) onwards proves that α1 > 1 > α−1.
Now that we have proved αl > α−l∀ l ∈ [L], we can rewrite the expression defining α−l in Algorithm 2
as
Sl =
1− α−l
αl − α−l . (25)
Substituting this expression for Sl in the definition of αl in Algorithm 2 and making some simple rearrange-
ments gives the desired result (11).
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 14
We have already shown (19) in the proof of Lemma 13 above that αl > 1 > α−l ∀ l ∈ [L].
Next we will show that αl+1 > αl and α−(l+1) < α−l ∀ l ≥ 0. First consider l = 0, for which
Algorithm 2 sets α0 = 1, and we have already proved that α1 > 1 > α−1.
Now consider some l > 0. Observe that since Slαl + (1 − Sl)α−l = 1 (Lemma 13), Sl+1 > Sl and
αl > α−l, it must be that
Sl+1αl + (1− Sl+1)α−l > 1 . (26)
From Lemma 13, we also have
Sl+1αl+1 + (1− Sl+1)α−(l+1) = 1 . (27)
Subtracting (26) from (27) we get
Sl+1(αl+1 − αl) + (1− Sl+1)(α−(l+1) − α−l) < 0 . (28)
From Lemma 13 we also have
Tl+1αl+1 + (1− Tl+1)α−(l+1) = Tl+1αl + (1− Tl+1)α−l (29)
⇒ Tl+1(αl+1 − αl) + (1− Tl+1)(α−(l+1) − α−l) = 0 . (30)
Subtracting (28) from (30) gives
(Tl+1 − Sl+1)[(αl+1 − αl) + (α−l − α−(l+1))] > 0 . (31)
Since Tl+1 > Sl+1 by definition, it must be that
αl+1 − αl > α−(l+1) − α−l . (32)
Now, rearranging the terms in (29) gives
(αl+1 − αl)Tl+1 = −(α−(l+1) − α−l)(1− Tl+1) . (33)
Since Tl+1 ∈ (0, 1), it follows that the terms (αl+1−αl) and (α−(l+1)−α−l) have opposite signs. Using (32)
we conclude that αl+1 − αl > 0 and α−(l+1) − α−l < 0.
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A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 15
Let us first prove (13). First consider the case z = m− 1. From Lemma 13 we know that
Tmαm−1 + (1− Tm)α−(m−1) = Tmαm + (1− Tm)α−m
⇒ 0 = Tm(αm − αm−1) + Tm(α−(m−1) − α−m)− (α−(m−1) − α−m)
< p(αm − αm−1) + p(α−(m−1) − α−m)− (α−(m−1) − α−m) , (34)
where (34) is a consequence of p > Tm and Lemma 14. A simple rearrangement of the terms in (34)
gives (13). Now, for any z < m, recursively apply this result to get
pαm + (1− p)α−m > pαm−1 + (1− p)α−(m−1)
> pαm−2 + (1− p)α−(m−2)
...
> pαz + (1− p)α−z .
Let us now prove (14). We first consider the case z = m+ 1. From Lemma 13 we know that
Tm+1αm + (1− Tm+1)α−m = Tm+1αm+1 + (1− Tm+1)α−(m+1)
⇒ 0 = Tm+1(αm+1 − αm) + Tm+1(α−m − α−(m+1))− (α−m − α−(m+1))
> p(αm+1 − αm) + p(α−m − α−(m+1))− (α−m − α−(m+1)) , (35)
where (35) is a consequence of p < Tm+1 and Lemma 14. A simple rearrangement of the terms in (35)
gives (14). For any z > m, applying this result recursively gives
pαm + (1− p)α−m > pαm+1 + (1− p)α−(m+1)
> pαm+2 + (1− p)α−(m+2)
...
> pαz + (1− p)α−z .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 8: Uniqueness of Algorithm 2
We will first define one additional piece of notation. Let g : {−L, . . . , L}N → R+ denote the expected
payment given an evaluation of the N answers, where the expectation is with respect to the (uniformly
random) choice of the G gold standard questions. If (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ {−L, . . . , L}N are the evaluations of
the worker’s answers to the N questions then the expected payment is
g(x1, . . . , xN ) =
1(
N
G
) ∑
(i1,...,iG)⊆{1,...,N}
f(xi1 , . . . , xiG) . (36)
Notice that when G = N , the functions f and g are identical.
The proof of uniqueness is based on a certain condition necessitated by incentive-compatibility stated in
the form of Lemma 16 below. Note that this lemma does not require the generalized-no-free-lunch condition,
and may be of independent interest.
Lemma 16 Any incentive-compatible mechanism must satisfy, for every question i ∈ {1, . . . , G}, every
(y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) ∈ {−L, . . . , L}G−1, and every m ∈ {1, . . . , L},
Tmf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= Tmf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m− 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−(m− 1), yi+1, . . . , yG) (37)
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and
Smf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Sm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) . (38)
Note that (37) and (38) coincide when m = 1, since T1 = S1 by definition.
We will first prove that any incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies the no-free-lunch condition
must give a zero payment when one or more questions are selected with a confidence L and turn out to be
incorrect. Let us assume for now that in the G questions in the gold standard, the first question is answered
incorrectly with a confidence of L, the next (G − 1 − S) questions are answered by the worker and have
arbitrary evaluations, and the remaining S questions are skipped. The proof proceeds by an induction on
S. If S = G − 1, the only attempted question is the first question and this is incorrect with confidence L.
The no-free-lunch condition necessitates a zero payment in this case, thus satisfying the base case of our
induction hypothesis. Now we prove the hypothesis for some S under the assumption that the hypothesis is
true for every S′ > S. From Lemma 4 with m = 1, we have
T1f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T1)f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
= T1f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T1)f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
= f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
= 0 , (39)
where the final equation (39) is a consequence of our induction hypothesis given the fact that f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
corresponds to the case when the last (S+ 1) questions are skipped and the first question is answered incor-
rectly with confidence L. Now, since the payment f must be non-negative and since T ∈ (0, 1), it must be
that
f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 (40)
and
f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 . (41)
Repeatedly applying the same argument to m = 2, . . . , L gives that for every value of m, it must be that
f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1,m, 0, . . . , 0) = f(−L, y2, . . . , yG−S−1,−m, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. This completes the
proof of our induction hypothesis. Observe that each of the aforementioned arguments hold for any permu-
tation of the G questions, thus proving the necessity of zero payment when any one or more answers are
incorrect.
We will now prove that when no answers in the gold standard are incorrect with confidence L, the
payment must be of the form described in Algorithm 1. Let κ denote the payment when all G questions in
the gold standard are skipped, i.e.,
κ = f(0, . . . , 0) .
Now consider any S ∈ {0, . . . , G − 1} and any (y1, . . . , yG−S−1,m) ∈ {−L, . . . , L}G−S . The payments
{f(y1, . . . , yG−S−1,m, 0, . . . , 0)}Lm=−L must satisfy the (2L−1) linear constraints arising out of Lemma 16
and must also satisfy f(y1, . . . , yG−S−1,−L, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. This comprises a total of 2L linearly indepen-
dent constraints on the (2L + 1) values {f(y1, . . . , yG−S−1,m, 0, . . . , 0)}Lm=−L. The only set of solutions
that meet these constraints are
f(y1, . . . , yG−S−1,m, 0, . . . , 0) = αmf(y1, . . . , yG−S−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ,
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where the constants {αm}Lm=−L are as specified in Algorithm 2. Applying this argument G times, starting
from S = 0 to S = G− 1, gives
f(y1, . . . , yG) = κ
G∏
j=1
αyj .
Finally, the budget requirement necessitates µmax = κ (αL)
G, which mandates the value of κ to be µmax
(
1
αL
)G
.
This is precisely the mechanism described in Algorithm 2.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 16: Necessary condition for any incentive-compatible mechanism
First consider the case of G = N . For every j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , G}, define
rj =
{
1− pj if yj ≥ 0
pj if yj < 0 .
Define E\i = {1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , G}. For any l ∈ {−L, . . . , L} let Λl ∈ R+ denote the expected
payment (from the worker’s point of view) when her answer to the ith question evaluates to l:
Λl =
∑
E\i∈{−1,1}G−1
f(y11, . . . , yi−1i−1, l, yi+1i+1, . . . , yGG) ∏
j∈[G]\{i}
r
1−j
2
j (1− rj)
1+j
2
 . (42)
Consider a worker who has confidences {p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pG} ∈ (0, 1)G−1 for questions {1, . . . , i−
1, i + 1, . . . , G} respectively, and for question i suppose she has a confidence of q ∈ (Tm−1, Tm+1). For
question i, we must incentivize the worker to select confidence-level m if q > Tm, and to select (m− 1) if
q < Tm. This necessitates
qΛm + (1− q)Λ−m
q<Tm
≶
q>Tm
qΛm−1 + (1− q)Λ−(m−1) . (43)
Also, for question i, the requirement of level m having a higher incentive as compared to skipping when
q > Sm and vice versa when q < Sm necessitates
qΛm + (1− q)Λ−m
q<Sm
≶
q>Sm
Λ0 . (44)
Now, note that for any real-valued variable q, and for any real-valued constants a, b and c,
aq
q<c
≶
q>c
b ⇒ ac = b .
Applying this fact to (43) and (44) gives
(TmΛm + (1− Tm)Λ−m)− (TmΛm−1 + (1− Tm)Λ−(m−1)) = 0 , (45)
(SmΛm + (1− Sm)Λ−m)− Λ0 = 0 . (46)
From the definition of Λl in (42), we see that the left hand sides of (45) and (46) are both polynomials
in (G − 1) variables {rj}j∈[G]\{i} and take a value of zero for all values of the variables in a (G − 1)-
dimensionall solid ball. Thus, each of the coefficients (of the monomials) in both polynomials must be zero,
and in particular, the constant terms must also be zero. Observe that in both these polynomials, the constant
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term arises only when j = 1 ∀ j ∈ [G]\{i} (which makes the exponent of rj to be 0 and that of (1− rj) to
be 1). Thus, setting the constant term to zero in the two polynomials results in
Tmf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= Tmf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m− 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−(m− 1), yi+1, . . . , yG) (47)
and
Smf(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Sm)f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) (48)
thus proving the claim for the case of G = N .
Now consider the case when G < N . In order to simplify notation, let us assume i = 1 without loss of
generality (since the arguments presented hold for any permutation of the questions). Suppose a worker’s
answers to questions {2, . . . , G} evaluate to (y2, . . . , yG) ∈ {−L, . . . , L}G−1, and further suppose that the
worker skips the remaining (N −G) questions. By going through arguments identical to those for G = N ,
but with f replaced by g, we get the necessity of
Tmg(m, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)g(−m, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0)
= Tmg(m− 1, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)g(−(m− 1), y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) (49)
and
Smg(m, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Sm)g(−m, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) = g(0, y2, . . . , yG, 0, . . . , 0) .
(50)
We will now use this result in terms of function g to get an equivalent result in terms of function f . For some
S ∈ {0, . . . , G− 1}, suppose yG−S+1 = 0, . . . , yG = 0. The remaining proof proceeds via an induction on
S. We begin with S = G− 1. In this case, (49) and (50) simplify to
Tmg(m, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)g(−m, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
= Tmg(m− 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)g(−(m− 1), 0, . . . , 0) (51)
and
Smg(m, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Sm)g(−m, 0, . . . , 0) = g(0, 0, . . . , 0) . (52)
Applying the definition of function g from (36) leads to
Tm (c1f(m, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0)) + (1− Tm) (c1f(−m, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0))
= Tm (c1f(m− 1, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0))
+ (1− Tm) (c1f(−(m− 1), 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0)) , (53)
and
Sm (c1f(m, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0)) + (1− Sm) (c1f(−m, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0))
= (c1f(0, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(0, 0, . . . , 0)) (54)
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for constants c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 that respectively denote the probabilities that the first question is picked
and not picked in the set of G gold standard questions. Cancelling out the common terms on both sides of
the equation, we get the desired results
Tmf(m, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)f(−m, 0, . . . , 0)
= Tmf(m− 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tm)f(−(m− 1), 0, . . . , 0) (55)
and
Smf(m, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Sm)f(−m, 0, . . . , 0) = f(0, 0, . . . , 0) . (56)
Next, we consider the case of a general S ∈ {0, . . . , G − 2} and assume that the result is true when
yG−S = 0, . . . , yG = 0. In (49) and (50), the functions g decompose into a sum of the constituent f
functions. These constituent functions f are of two types: the first where all of the first (G − S) questions
are included in the gold standard, and the second where one or more of the first (G − S) questions are
not included in the gold standard. The second case corresponds to situations where there are more than S
questions skipped in the gold standard, i.e., when yG−S = 0, . . . , yG = 0, and hence satisfies our induction
hypothesis. The terms corresponding to these functions thus cancel out in the expansion of (49) and (50).
The remainder comprises only evaluations of function f for arguments in which the first (G− S) questions
are included in the gold standard: since the last (N − G + S) questions are skipped by the worker, the
remainder evaluates to
Tmc3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)c3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= Tmc3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,m− 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Tm)c3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−(m− 1), yi+1, . . . , yG) ,
Smc3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,m, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− Sm)c3f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−m, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= c3f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) ,
for some constant c3 > 0. Dividing throughout by c3 gives the desired result.
Finally, the arguments above hold for any permutation of the first G questions, thus completing the
proof.
A.5 Necessity of Tl > Sl for the Problem to be Well Defined
We now show that the restriction Tl > Sl was necessary when defining the thresholds in Section 4.
Proposition 17 Incentive-compatiblity necessitates Tl > Sl ∀ l ∈ {2, . . . , L}, even in the absence of the
generalized-no-free-lunch axiom.
First observe that the proof of Lemma 16 did not employ the generalized-no-free-lunch axiom, neither
did it assume Tl > Sl. We will thus use the result of Lemma 16 to prove our claim.
Suppose the confidence of the worker for all but the first question is lower than T1 and that the worker
decides to skip all these questions. Suppose the worker attempts the first question. In order to ensure that
the worker selects the answer that she believes is most likely to be true, it must be that
f(l, 0, . . . , 0) > f(−l, 0, . . . , 0) ∀l ∈ [L] . (57)
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We now call upon Lemma 16 where we set i = 1, m = l, y2 = . . . , yG = 0. Using the fact that
Tl > Tl−1 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . , L}, we get
Tlf(l, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tl)f(−l, 0, . . . , 0)
= Tlf(l − 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tl)f(−(l − 1), 0, . . . , 0) (58)
> Tl−1f(l − 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tl−1)f(−(l − 1), 0, . . . , 0) (59)
= Tl−1f(l − 2, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tl−1)f(−(l − 2), 0, . . . , 0) (60)
> Tl−2f(l − 2, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Tl−2)f(−(l − 2), 0, . . . , 0) (61)
...
> T1f(1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T1)f(−1, 0, . . . , 0) (62)
= f(0, . . . , 0) (63)
= Slf(l, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− Sl)f(−l, 0, . . . , 0). (64)
Since f(l, 0, . . . , 0) > f(−l, 0, . . . , 0), we have our desired result.
A.6 A Stronger No-free-lunch Condition: Impossibility Results
In this section, we prove the various claims regarding the strong no-free-lunch condition studied in Section 5.
A.6.1 Proof of Proposition 9
If the worker skips all questions, then the expected payment is zero under the strong-no-free-lunch axiom.
On the other hand, in order to incentivize knowledgeable workers to select answers whenever their con-
fidences are greater than T , there must exist some situation in which the payment is strictly larger than
zero. Suppose the payment is strictly positive when questions {1, . . . , z} are answered correctly, questions
{z + 1, . . . , z′} are answered incorrectly, and the remaining questions are skipped. If the confidence of the
unknowledgeable worker is in the interval (0, T ) for every question, then attempting to answer questions
{1, . . . , z′} and skipping the rest fetches her a payment that is strictly positive in expectation. Thus, this
unknowledgeable worker is incentivized to answer at least one question.
A.6.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Consider a (knowledgeable) worker who has a confidence of p ∈ (T, 1] for the first question, q ∈ (0, 1) for
the second question, and confidences in the interval (0, T ) for the remaining questions. Suppose the worker
attempts to answer the first question (and selects the answer the believes is most likely to be correct) and
skips the last (N − 2) questions as desired. Now, in order to incentivize her to answer the second question
if q > T and skip the second question if q < T , the payment mechanism must satisfy
pqg(1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− p)qg(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + p(1− q)g(1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
+ (1− p)(1− q)g(−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
q<T
≶
q>T
pg(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− p)g(−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) . (65)
For any real-valued variable q, and for any real-valued constants a, b and c,
aq
q<c
≶
q>c
b ⇒ ac = b .
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As a result,
pTg(1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− p)Tg(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + p(1− T )g(1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
+ (1− p)(1− T )g(−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)− pg(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)− (1− p)g(−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 . (66)
The left hand side of this equation is a polynomial in variable p and takes a value of zero for all values of
p in a one-dimensional box (T, 1]. It follows that the monomials of this polynomial must be zero, and in
particular the constant term must be zero:
Tg(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− T )g(−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0)− g(−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 . (67)
The strong-no-free-lunch condition implies f(−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) = f(−1, 0, . . . , 0) = f(0, . . . , 0) = 0, and
hence g(−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) = g(−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. Since T ∈ (0, 1), we have
0 = g(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (68)
= c1f(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(−1, 0, . . . , 0) + c2f(1, 0, . . . , 0) , (69)
for some constants c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 that represent the probability that the first two questions are included
in the gold standard, and the probability that the first (or, second) but not the second (or, first) questions are
included in the gold standard. Since f is a non-negative function, it must be that
f(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 . (70)
Now suppose a (knowledgeable) worker has a confidence of p ∈ (T, 1] for the first question and confidences
lower than T for the remaining (N − 1) questions. Suppose the worker chooses to skip the last (N − 1)
questions as desired. In order to incentivize the worker to answer the first question, the mechanism must
satisfy for all p ∈ (T, 1],
0 < pg(1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− p)g(−1, 0, . . . , 0)− g(0, 0, . . . , 0)
= pc3f(1, 0, . . . , 0) + pc4f(0, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− p)c3f(−1, 0, . . . , 0)
+ (1− p)c4f(0, 0, . . . , 0)− f(0, 0, . . . , 0)
= 0, (71)
where c3 > 0 and c4 > 0 are some constants. The final equation is a result of the strong-no-free-lunch
condition and the fact that f(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 as proved above. This yields a contradiction, and hence no
incentive-compatible mechanism f can satisfy the strong-no-free-lunch condition when G < N even when
allowed to address only knowledgeable workers.
Finally, as a sanity check, note that if G = N then c2 = 0 in (69). The proof above thus doesn’t hold
when G = N .
A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 11
We will first show that the mechanism works as desired.
First consider the case when the worker is unknowledgeable and her confidences are of the form T >
p(1) ≥ p(2) ≥ p(3) ≥ · · · ≥ p(G). If she answers only the first question, then her expected payment is
κ
p(1)
T
.
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Let us now see her expected payment if she doesn’t follow this answer pattern. The strong-no-free-lunch
condition implies that if the worker doesn’t answer any question then her expected payment is zero. Suppose
the worker chooses to answer questions {i1, . . . , iz}. In that case, her expected payment is
κ
pi1 · · · piz
T z
= κ
pi1
T
· · · piz
T
(72)
≤ κ
(p(1)
T
)z
(73)
≤ κp(1)
T
, (74)
where (74) uses the fact that p(1) < T . The inequality in (74) becomes an equality only when z = 1. Now
when z = 1, the inequality in (73) becomes an equality only when i1 = (1). Thus the unknowledgeable
worker is incentivized to answer only one question – the one that she has the highest confidence in.
Now consider a knowledgeable worker and suppose her confidences are of the form p(1) ≥ · · · ≥ p(m) >
T > p(m+1) ≥ · · · ≥ p(G) for some m ≥ 1. If the worker answers questions (1), . . . , (m) as desired, her
expected payment is
κ
p(1)
T
· · · p(m)
T
.
Now let us see what happens if the worker does not follow this answer pattern. The strong-no-free-lunch
condition implies that if the worker doesn’t answer any question then her expected payment is zero. Now, if
she answers some other set of questions, say questions {i1, . . . , iz} with p(1) ≤ pi1 < · · · < piy ≤ p(m) <
piy+1 < · · · piz ≤ p(G). The expected payment in that case is
κ
pi1 · · · piz
T z
= κ
pi1
T
· · · piz
T
(75)
≤ κpi1
T
· · · piy
T
(76)
≤ κp(1)
T
· · · p(m)
T
(77)
where inequality (76) is a result of
pij
T ≤ 1 ∀ j > y and holds with equality only when y = z. Inequality (77)
is a result of
p(j)
T ≥ 1 ∀ j ≤ m and holds with equality only when y = m. Thus the expected payment is
maximized when i1 = (1), . . . , iz = (m) as desired. Finally, the payment strictly increases with an increase
in the confidences, and hence the worker is incentivized to always consider the answer that she believes is
most likely to be correct.
We will now show that this mechanism is unique.
The necessary conditions derived in Lemma 4, when restricted toG = N and (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) 6=
{0}N−1, is also applicable to the present setting. This is because the strong-no-free-lunch condition as-
sumed here is a stronger condition than the no-free-lunch axiom considered in Lemma 4, and moreover,
(y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) 6= {0}N−1 avoids the use of unknowledgeable workers in the proof of Lemma 4.
It follows that for every question i∈{1, . . . , G} and every (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG)∈{−1, 0, 1}G−1\{0}G−1,
it must be that
Tf(y1, . . . , yi−1, 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) + (1− T )f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−1, yi+1, . . . , yG)
= f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) . (78)
We claim that the payment must be zero whenever the number of incorrect answers W > 0. The proof
proceeds by induction on the number of correct answers C. First suppose C = 0 (and W > 0). Then all
questions are either wrong or skipped, and hence by the strong-no-free-lunch condition, the payment must
be zero. Now suppose the payment is necessarily zero whenever W > 0 and the total number of correct
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answers is (C − 1) or lower, for some C ∈ [G − 1]. Consider any evaluation (y1, . . . , yG) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}G
in which the number of incorrect answers is more than zero and the number of correct answers is C. Sup-
pose yi = 1 for some i ∈ [G], and yj = −1 for some j ∈ [G]\{i}. Then from the induction hypothesis,
we have f(y1, . . . , yi−1,−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) = f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) = 0. Applying (78) and
noting that T ∈ (0, 1), we get that f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) = 0 as claimed. This result also al-
lows us to simplify (78) to: For every question i ∈ {1, . . . , G} and every (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yG) ∈
{−1, 0, 1}G−1\{0}G−1,
f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 1, yi+1, . . . , yG) =
1
T
f(y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, yi+1, . . . , yG) . (79)
We now show that when C > 0 and W = 0, the payment must necessarily be of the form described in
the statement of Proposition 11. The proof again proceeds via an induction on the number of correct answers
C (≥ 1). Define a quantity κ > 0 as
κ = Tf(1, 0, . . . , 0) . (80)
Now consider the payment f(1, y2, . . . , yG) for some (y2, . . . , yG) ∈ {0, 1}G−1\{0}G−1 withC correct
answers. Applying (79) repeatedly (once for every i such that yi = 1), we get
f(1, y2, . . . , yG) =
κ
TC
. (81)
Unlike other results in this paper, at this point we cannot claim the result to hold for all permutations of
the questions. This is because we have defined the quantity κ in an asymmetric manner (80), in terms of the
payment function when the first question is correct and the rest are skipped. In what follows, we will prove
that the result claimed in the statement of Proposition 11 indeed holds for all permutations of the questions.
From (79) we have
f(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) = Tf(1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (82)
= f(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) (83)
= κ . (84)
Thus the payment must be κ even if the second answer in the gold standard is correct and the rest are
skipped. In fact, the argument holds when any one answer in the gold standard is correct and the rest are
skipped. Thus the definition of κ is not restricted to the first question alone as originally defined in (80),
but holds for all permutations of the questions. This allows the other arguments above to be applicable to
any permutation of the questions. Finally, the budget constraint of µmax fixes the value of κ to that claimed,
thereby completing the proof.
A.6.4 Proof of Proposition 12
Proposition 11 proved that under the skip-based setting with the strong-no-free-lunch condition, the payment
must be zero when one or more answers are incorrect. This part of the proof of Proposition 11 holds even
when L > 1. It follows that for any question, the penalty for an incorrect answer is the same for any
confidence-level in {1, . . . , L}. Thus the worker is incentivized to always select that confidence-level for
which the payment is the maximum when the answer is correct, irrespective of her own confidence about
the question. This contradicts our requirements.
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B Details of Experiments
In this section, we provide further details about the experiments described earlier in Section 6.2. The ex-
periments were carried out on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) online crowdsourcing platform
in the time period June to October 2013. Figure 6 illustrates the interface shown to the workers for each
of the experiments described in Section 6.2, while Figure 7 depicts the instructions given to the work-
ers. The following are more details of each individual experiment. In the description, the notation κ is as
defined in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, namely, κ = (µmax − µmin)TG for the skip-based setting and
κ = (µmax − µmin)
(
1
αL
)G
for the confidence-based setting.
B.1 Recognizing the Golden Gate Bridge
A set of 21 photographs of bridges were shown to the workers, and for each photograph, they had to identify
if it depicted the Golden Gate Bridge or not. An example of this task is depicted in Figure 6a, and the
instructions provided to the worker under the three mechanisms are depicted in Figure 7. The fixed amount
offered to workers was µmin = 3 cents for the task, and the bonus was based on 3 gold standard questions.
We compared (a) the baseline mechanism with 5 cents for each correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the
skip-based mechanism with κ = 5.9 and 1T = 1.5, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism with κ = 5.9
cents, L = 2, α2 = 1.5, α1 = 1.4, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.5, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment are
presented in Figure 4a.
B.2 Transcribing Vehicles’ License Plate Numbers from Photographs
This task presented the workers with 18 photographs of cars and asked them to transcribe the license plate
numbers from each of them (source of photographs: http://www.coolpl8z.com). An example of this task is
depicted in Figure 6b. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 4 cents for the task, and the bonus
was based on 4 gold standard questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism with 10 cents for each
correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 0.62 and 1T = 3, and (c) the
confidence-based mechanism with κ = 3.1 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.95, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.5 α−2 = 0.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4b. When evaluating, in the worker’s answers as well
as in the true solutions, we converted all text to upper case, and removed all spaces and punctuations. We
then declared a worker’s answer to be in error if it did not have an exact match with the true solution.
B.3 Classifying Breeds of Dogs
This task required workers to identify the breeds of dogs shown in 85 images (source of images: [KJYL11,
DDS+09]). For each image, the worker was given ten breeds to choose from. An example of this task
is depicted in Figure 6c. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 5 cents for the task, and the
bonus was based on 7 gold standard questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism with 8 cents for
each correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 0.78 and 1T = 2, and
(c) the confidence-based mechanism with κ = 0.78 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.66, α0 = 1, α−1 =
0.67, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4c.
B.4 Identifying Heads of Countries
Names of 20 personalities were provided and had to be classified as to whether they were ever the (a)
President of the USA, (b) President of India, (c) Prime Minister of Canada, or (d) neither of these. An
example of this task is depicted in Figure 6d. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 2 cents
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for the task, and the bonus was based on 4 gold standard questions. While the ground truth in most other
multiple-choice experiments had approximately an equal representation from all classes, this experiment
was heavily biased with one of the classes never being correct and another being correct for just 3 of the
20 questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism with 2.5 cents for each correct answer in the gold
standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 0.25 and 1T = 3, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism
with κ = 1.3 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.95, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.5, α−2 = 0. The results of this
experiment are presented in Figure 4d.
B.5 Identifying Flags
This was a relatively long task, with 126 questions. Each question required the workers to identify if a
displayed flag belonged to a place in (a) Africa, (b) Asia/Oceania, (c) Europe, or (d) neither of these. An
example of this task is depicted in Figure 6e. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 4 cents for
the task, and the bonus was based on 8 gold standard questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism
with 4 cents for each correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 0.2 and
1
T = 2, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism with κ = 0.2 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.66, α0 =
1, α−1 = 0.67, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4e.
B.6 Distinguishing Textures
This task required the workers to identify the textures shown in 24 grayscale images (source of images: [LSP05,
Dataset 1: Textured surfaces]). For each image, the worker had to choose from 8 different options. Such
a task has applications in computer vision, where it aids in recognition of objects or their surroundings.
An example of this task is depicted in Figure 6f. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 3
cents for the task, and the bonus was based on 4 gold standard questions. We compared (a) the base-
line mechanism with 10 cents for each correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the skip-based mecha-
nism with κ = 3.1 and 1T = 2, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism with κ = 3.1 cents, L = 2,
α2 = 2, α1 = 1.66, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.67, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment are presented in
Figure 4f.
B.7 Transcribing Text from an Image: Film Certificate
The task showed an image containing 11 (short) lines of blurry text which the workers had to decipher. We
used text from a certain certificate which movies releasing in India are provided. We slightly modified its
text in order to prevent workers from searching a part of it online and obtaining the entire text by searching
the first few transcribed lines on the internet. An example of this task is depicted in Figure 6g. The fixed
amount offered to workers was µmin = 5 cents for the task, and the bonus was based on 2 gold standard
questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism with 20 cents for each correct answer in the gold
standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 5.5 and 1T = 3, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism
with κ = 12.5 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.95, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.5, α−2 = 0. The results of this
experiment are presented in Figure 4g. When evaluating, in the worker’s answers as well as in the true
solutions, we converted all text to upper case, and removed all spaces and punctuations. We then declared a
worker’s answer to be in error if it did not have an exact match with the true solution.
B.8 Transcribing Text from an Image: Script of a Play
The task showed an image containing 12 (short) lines of blurry text which the workers had to decipher. We
borrowed a paragraph from Shakespeare’s play ‘As You Like It.’ We slightly modified the text of the play in
order to prevent workers from searching a part of it online and obtaining the entire text by searching the first
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few transcribed lines on the internet. An example of this task is depicted in Figure 6h. The fixed amount
offered to workers was 5 cents for the task, and the bonus was based on 2 gold standard questions. We
compared (a) the baseline mechanism with µmin = 20 cents for each correct answer in the gold standard,
(b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 5.5 and 1T = 3, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism with
κ = 12.5 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.95, α0 = 1, α−1 = 0.5, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment
are presented in Figure 4h. When evaluating, in the worker’s answers as well as in the true solutions, we
converted all text to upper case, and removed all spaces and punctuations. We then declared a worker’s
answer to be in error if it did not have an exact match with the true solution.
B.9 Transcribing Text from Audio Clips
The workers were given 10 audio clips which they had to transcribe to text. Each audio clip was 3 to
6 seconds long, and comprised of a short sentence, e.g., “my favourite topics of conversation are sports,
politics, and movies.” Each of the clips were recorded in different accents using a text-to-speech converter.
An example of this task is depicted in Figure 6i. The fixed amount offered to workers was µmin = 5 cents for
the task, and the bonus was based on 2 gold standard questions. We compared (a) the baseline mechanism
with 20 cents for each correct answer in the gold standard, (b) the skip-based mechanism with κ = 5.5 and
1
T = 3, and (c) the confidence-based mechanism with κ = 12.5 cents, L = 2, α2 = 2, α1 = 1.95, α0 =
1, α−1 = 0.5, α−2 = 0. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4i.
Transcribe*text*(playscript)*
Line 1: 
Line 2: 
Transcribe*text*(cer2ficate)*
Transcribe*the*audio*clip*
Answer: 
Recognize*the**
Golden*Gate*Bridge*
Golden Gate 
NOT Golden Gate 
a 
Iden2fy*heads*of*countries*
Mohandas Gandhi 
President of the USA 
President of India 
Prime Minister of Canada 
None of the above 
d 
h g 
Mark*the*breed*of*the*dog*
 Afghan Hound 
 Doberman 
 French Bulldog 
 Tibetan Terrier 
         
c 
i 
Iden2fy*the*texture*
Granite 
Carpet 
Fur 
Glass 
Corduroy 
Wood 
None of these 
f 
Transcribe*the**
license*plate*number*
Answer: 
b 
Mark*the*con2nent*
to*which*the*flag*belongs*
e 
 Africa 
 Asia/Oceania 
 Europe 
 None of these 
Line 1: 
Line 2: 
Figure 6: Various tasks on which the payment mechanisms were tested. The interfaces shown are that of the
baseline mechanism, i.e., without the skipping or confidence choices.
C General Utility Functions
In this section, we consider a setting where the worker, instead of maximizing her expected payment, aims to
maximize the expected value of some utility function of her payment. Consider any function U : R+ → I,
where I is any interval on the real number line. We will require the function U to be strictly increasing and
to have an inverse. Examples of such functions include U(x) = log(1 + x) with I = R+, U(x) =
√
x
with I = R+, and U(x) = 1 − e−x with I = [0, 1]. For any payment f made to the worker (based on the
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For$each$answer,$you$also$need$to$indicate$how$sure$you$are$about$that$answer$
$If$you$are$not$sure$about$any$answer,$then$mark$"I$don't$know”$
$You$need$to$mark$at$least$something$for$every$ques?on,$otherwise$your$work$will$be$rejected$
$
***$Instruc?ons$for$BONUS$(Read$Carefully)$***$
• If$any$answer$marked$"absolutely$sure"$is$wrong,$your$bonus$will$become$ZERO$for$this$en?re$HIT$(you$do$not$get$any$bonus$for$this$HIT)$
• For$every$answer$marked$"absolutely$sure"$that$is$correct,$your$bonus$will$INCREASE$BY$50%$(every$1$cent$will$become$1.5$cents)$
• For$every$answer$marked$"moderately$sure"$that$is$wrong,$your$bonus$will$be$HALVED$(every$1$cent$will$become$half$a$cent)$
• For$every$answer$marked$"moderately$sure"$that$is$correct,$your$bonus$will$be$INCREASE$BY$40%$(every$1$cent$will$become$1.4$cents)$
• Marking$"I$don't$know"$for$any$answer$does$not$change$your$bonus$
If$you$are$not$sure$about$any$answer,$then$mark$"I'm$not$sure”$
You$need$to$mark$at$least$something$for$every$ques?on,$otherwise$your$work$will$be$rejected$
$
***$Instruc?ons$for$BONUS$(Read$Carefully)$***$
• You$start$with$5.9$cents$of$bonus$for$this$HIT$
• There$are$three$ques?ons$whose$answers$are$known$to$us,$based$on$which$the$bonus$is$calculated$
• For$each$of$these$ques?ons$you$answer$CORRECTLY,$your$bonus$will$INCREASE$BY$50%$(every$1$cent$will$become$1.5$cents)$
• If$you$answer$any$of$these$ques?ons$WRONG,$your$bonus$will$become$ZERO$
• So$for$ques?ons$you$are$not$sure$of,$mark$the$"I'm$not$sure"$op?on:$this$does$not$affect$the$bonus$
***$Instruc?ons$for$BONUS$(Read$Carefully)$***$
• There$are$three$ques?ons$whose$answers$are$known$to$us,$based$on$which$the$bonus$is$calculated$
• BONUS$(cents)=$5$*$number$of$ques?ons$out$of$these$that$you$correctly$answer$$
a Baseline*Mechanism*
b SkipEbased*mul2plica2ve*mechanism*
c ConfidenceEbased*mul2plica2ve*mechanism*
Figure 7: An example of the instructions displayed to the worker under the three mechanisms.
evaluation of her answers to the gold standard questions), her utility for this payment is U(f). The worker
aims to maximize the expected value of U(f), where the expectation is with respect to her beliefs regarding
correctness of her answers and the uniformly random distribution of the G gold standard questions among
the set ofN questions. The function U is assumed to be known to the worker as well as the system designer.
Consider the confidence-based setting of Section 4 (of which, the skip-based setting of Section 3 is a
special case). Recall the notation {xi}Gi=1, {αj}Lj=−L and κ from Algorithm 2. Also recall the (generalized-
)no-free-lunch axiom which mandates a zero payment if, in the gold standard, (all attempted questions are
marked as the highest confidence L and) the answers to all the attempted questions are incorrect. The
following proposition extends the results of the main text in the paper to this setting with utility functions.
Proposition 18 For a worker who aims to maximize function U of the payment, the one and only mechanism
that is incentive-compatible and satisfies the (generalized-)no-free-lunch axiom is
Payment(x1, . . . , xG) = U−1
(
κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + U(µmin)
)
,
where the constants {αj}Lj=−L are as defined in Algorithm 2 and κ = (U(µmax)− U(µmin))α−GL .
Note that for the problem to be well defined, the interval [µmin, µmax] should be contained in the interval
I. The proof of Proposition 18 follows easily from the results proved earlier in the paper, and is provided
below for completeness.
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Proof of Proposition 18. We will first verify that the proposed payment is always non-negative and satis-
fies the (generalized-)no-free-lunch axiom. Recall from Theorem 7 that for every evaluation {x1, . . . , xG}
for which the (generalized-)no-free-lunch axiom mandates a zero payment, the value of κ
∏G
i=1 αxi is zero.
It follows that the payment U−1
(
κ
∏G
i=1 αxi + U(µmin)
)
= U−1(0 + U(µmin)) = µmin, where the final
equation is a consequence of the invertibility of U . Further, recall that the value of κ
∏G
i=1 αxi in Algo-
rithm 2 is never smaller than zero. Since the function U is increasing, so is U−1, and hence the payment is
always non-negative.
We will now prove that the proposed payment is incentive-compatible. To this end, observe that the
utility of the proposed payment is
U(Payment) = U
(
U−1
(
κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + U(µmin)
))
= κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + U(µmin) .
Noting that U(0) is a constant independent of the worker’s answers, the result of Theorem 7 implies that the
expectation of U(Payment) behaves exactly as required for incentive-compatibility.
We will now prove uniqueness of this mechanism. Replacing f(·) by U(Payment(·)) in the proof of
Theorem 8, we get that the function U(Payment) must be of the form
U(Payment(x1, . . . , xG)) = c1
G∏
i=1
αxi + c2,
for some constants c1 and c2, where {αxj}Lj=−L are as defined in Algorithm 2. In other words, the payment
must be of the form
Payment(x1, . . . , xG) = U−1
(
c1
G∏
i=1
αxi + c2
)
.
One can evaluate that the maximum value of this payment is c1 + c2. From our µmax-budget constraint, we
then have c1 + c2 = µmax. Furthermore, When the evaluations x1, . . . , xG are such that the (generalized-
)no-free-lunch applies, we need Payment = µmin. It follows that c2 = U(µmin), and consequently c1 =
U(µmax)− U(µmin), thereby completing the proof.
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